

"A gdje su oni bili dosad?" Starenje, skrb i napuštanje u jednom bosanskom gradu

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“WHERE WERE THEY UNTIL NOW?” Aging, Care and Abandonment in a Bosnian Town

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This article delves into Bosnia-Herzegovina, and especially into the town of Bihać, to ethnographically examine the changing nature of the state and family, as visible through practices of elder care. I use my ethnographic data gathered at a nursing home Vitalis in Bihać, and especially the predicament of an elderly Bosnian woman whom I call Zemka, to argue that both the state and family in postwar and postsocialist Bosnia-Herzegovina materialize as semi-absent. In the process of unpacking these multiple semi-absences, I reveal the lived effects of changing postwar and postsocialist state, and altering kinship relations as they affect “ordinary” people.

Keywords: care, aging, the state, family, semi-absence, socialism and postsocialism, war and postwar

The “crisis of care” (Phillips and Benner 1995), and especially care for the elderly, is emerging as a momentous topic in anthropology, sociology, gerontology and other academic disciplines, as well as in the world of policy-making. Numerous studies point at different domains of this “crisis”, including the socio-economic impact of the longer life span in more privileged parts of the world; shrinking of states’ social and health services; and novel configurations of family relationships that challenge traditional expectations of caregiving in diverse socio-cultural contexts (see United Nations 2002).

In this article, I delve into the Balkans, and especially Bosnia-Herzegovina, to examine the effects of these shifting topographies and modalities of care on “ordinary”¹ lives. It is within the Balkans, I argue, that the anxiety around “the aging predicament”, and the altering roles of family and state in providing care for the elderly are especially evident and exacerbated by the converging postsocialist (1989 to present) and postwar (1995 to present) transformations (see also Havelka 2003).

This domain of social transformation is left unexamined by the majority of scholars of the region.² The overwhelming number of anthropological and other studies of the Balkans and especially Bosnia-Herzegovina, my own included, analyze this region mainly through the lens of ethnicity, nationalism and postwar reconstruction (see, among many others, Bieber 2005; Brown 2006; Chandler 1999; Campbell 1999; Coles 2007; Fassin and Pandolfi 2010; Hayden 1996; Hromadžić 2015; Jansen 2005; Kurtović 2011; Sorabji 1995; Veredery 1994; Woodward 1995). The concerns of “ordinary people”, however, reflect many other domains of struggle, which powerfully and complexly shape the lives of people and yet, they stay either invisible or marginalized in the majority of (ethno)nationalism-focused studies (for an

¹ I use “ordinary people” with much caution in this work. As Veena Das (2007) has pointed out, “everyday” is where much deeply political work happens.

² This “omission” is closely related to the ways in which what counts as (useful) knowledge (about the Balkans in this case) is being produced, and to the distribution of research grants and fellowships.

exception see, among a few others, Stubbs 2002; Stubbs and Maglajlić 2012; Završek and Leskošek 2005).³

In what follows, I seek to illuminate some of these literature-marginalized yet life-shaping forces and events by focusing on competing expectations and ideologies of care and responsibility as they converge in the lives of ordinary Bosnians. In order to do so, I focus on the predicament of one of those people, an elderly woman whom I call Zemka,⁴ and whose struggles with care, responsibility, and neglect beautifully capture the ways in which the state, home and exile (Lamb 2009), abandonment (Biehl 2005; Bourgois 2009), and societal abjection (Gilleard and Higgs 2011) are being talked about, lived, and imagined.

In my use of Zemka's story, I work against "geroanthropological amnesia" (Cohen 1994: 151) which tends to romanticize, contain, dehistoricize and depoliticize the old age. Rather, I locate this ethnographic encounter within the sphere of "the political", in an anthropological, thus broad and contextual, sense of politics. The story's powerful content is used to shed light on the historically-informed arrangements of care which are emerging, converging and reassembling from the ruins of war and socialism. More specifically, I use ethnography as a hermeneutic device to seize and make sense of the effects of changing postwar and postsocialist state and altering kinship relations as they affect ordinary people. Zemka's is thus a story of aging dislocated; by gently hinting at its phenomenological (experiential and embodied), rational/political (hegemonic, ideological and gendered) and hermeneutic dimensions (Cohen 1994: 151), in this article I argue that both the state and family in postwar and postsocialist Bosnia-Herzegovina materialize as semi-absent: the state is bureaucratically and politically ubiquitous but biopolitically shrinking, and family is materially present but physically elsewhere. It is within the contours of uneven and multiple, politically and socially generated semi-absences that we can begin to grasp the terrain of aging and care as fundamental dimensions of political and social practice in Bosnia where "lives seem habitually at stake" (Jašarević 2011: 109).

"I am going to Amerika, to live with my son"

It is early June 2013 and a warm day in Bihać, a north-western Bosnian town⁵ located at the border with Croatia. Together with several other residents, I am sitting in a shade of a huge umbrella in front of "Vitalis" – a privately owned, two-year-old and 20-bed capacity home for the elderly. A car, which model and color I fail to decipher in the bright, mid-day sun, parks

³ This is not to say, of course, that ethnonationalism is not important to people in the Balkans. Rather, it is one of numerous powerful forces – including poverty, unemployment and corruption – that converge to mold ordinary lives.

⁴ All personal names have been changed to protect the privacy of individuals included in this study.

⁵ The Bihać region, also known as Krajina, with approximately 300,000 mostly Bosniak residents, is the northwestern pocket of the country and "Bosnia's forgotten battlefield" (O' Shea 2012). The region suffered terribly during the war in the 1990s. The largest town is Bihać, the 6th largest Bosnian-Herzegovinian town of approximately 50,000 inhabitants. The region was besieged for over 3 years but never conquered by the Serb army. At the beginning of the war, the Serb population of Bihać left the city for other Serb-dominated regions of the country or for abroad. The war began in June 1992 with the Serb army besieging and intensely shelling the town. Bosniak (roughly 66 percent of the town's population) and Croat (roughly 8 percent of the town's population) armies and civilians defended their town jointly during over 3 years of siege. In addition, in 1993, the northern part of the besieged region, led by the businessmen turn politician Fikret Abdić, proclaimed independence from the Bosnian government and its army, and started to collaborate with the Serb forces. This created a very difficult situation for the besieged region, which was liberated in the controversial Bosnian-Croatian Army offensive in the August of 1995, soon after which the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed. The Agreement brought peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina and divided the country into Bosniak-Croat Federation (51% of territory) and Republika Srpska (49% of territory). These entities were given all the characteristics of states within a more complex state. The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is further divided into 10 cantons. Bihać is the administrative center and the largest city in the Una-Sana Canton.

in the driveway of "Vitalis". Lidija, the owner of the home jumps on her feet and rushes to the gate in order to welcome the home's new resident, Zemka. I see a middle aged man come out of the driver's seat and open the back door. The man lifts Zemka from the back seat and gently lowers her in the wheelchair – we "park" Zemka at the second, large table. Several other residents look at the newcomer, curiously. The man who brought Zemka to "Vitalis" collapses into one of the chairs, sweating. He wipes his face, impatiently. I look at Zemka – her hands are deep purple, almost black. I see that below her hospital gown, marked by dried blood in several large spots, her feet are also swollen and dark.

The man, whose name is Sead, starts telling me the dramatic story of Zemka's arrival at "Vitalis": Zemka was released from Bihać's cantonal hospital today. Two days ago, the hospital called Zemka's three daughters who live in Germany and informed them that the family needed to come and collect their mother by 2 p.m. the following day – the hospital has done everything it could and now it was the family's turn and responsibility to take care of her. The daughters – Ekrema, Selma and Adila – thousands of miles away and busy with their jobs and their own nuclear families, panicked, knowing that they could not come to Bihać in time to take over their feeble mother. Frantically, they searched on the Internet for some institution to turn to; that is how they discovered Lidija's privately owned nursing home. At the same time, they contacted the closest and nearest family relative, Sead, who lives two and a half hours away from Bihać, near a central Bosnian town, Jajce. He told them that he was willing to help, but could not be there by 2 p.m. the next day.

Lidija was moved by the plea of this family which, she learned soon, suffered greatly during and after the war. She wanted to help but did not have any beds available. Thus, she called the hospital and asked that they keep Zemka for another day while she prepared for her arrival. The main nurse, according to Lidija, said harshly: "No, we cannot do that. We do not make money off of them", implying that Lidija lives off of the old people's predicament. Lidija was so upset by the comment that she threatened to call the police and tell them that the state hospital was throwing out an 80-year-old refugee woman on the street. After Lidija's threat, the nurse softened and said that the hospital would keep Zemka under their roof for another day.

While Lidija is telling us this story, Zemka looks at me, smiles and says: "I am going to Amerika [the US], to live with my son." Sead shakes his head sadly and whispers to me: 'She has dementia. Her son was killed during the war in Srebrenica.' Sead finishes his drink, gets up, hugs his fragile aunt in a blood-stained hospital gown, and leaves for Jajce. Soon after, I also leave the home, deeply moved. Five days later, on the way to "Vitalis", I see an obituary announcing Zemka's death; her *dženaza* (the Islamic funeral ritual), the obituary stated, was scheduled for the next day. I arrive at the nursing home in the early afternoon and find Zemka's daughters sitting in front of the home, talking to Lidija and other residents. They are here for their mother's funeral and they are sad and furious. They complain about the state that "has no order nor system" ('nema ni reda ni sistema'), where hospitals can throw old and sick out on the street, and where "the family of a shahid or martyr" ('šehidska familija') can be treated like this. They are going to sue the hospital! They live in Germany, and something like this would never happen there! Lidija, who also spent some refugee years in Germany, nods in agreement. She gently tries to soothe the family. The sisters finally leave. As we watch their car drive away, Lidija whispers to me: "They cannot sue them. Do you know that Zemka arrived to the hospital in a terrible condition? She was neglected. I mean, where were they [the family] until now?"

Zemka's story is remarkably rich – it captures, discloses, and complicates multiple affective attachments and practical relationships of love, care, and abandonment as they are being refashioned in a postwar context at the end of socialism. Zemka is a subject who fell through

the cracks and eventually died caught between these shifting topographies of care and neglect. In order to unpack Zemka's unique story, I situate it within (post)war and postsocialist fields. Even though postwar and postsocialist effects are profoundly tangled in the lives of people, for the purpose of analytic clarity, I divide them into two separate sections. To the spectrum of the (post)war experience we first turn.

(Post)War assemblages: *šehidi*, life and death

Zemka's family was caught at the epicenter of the Yugoslav wars in 1990s. The Bosnian war caught this already elderly woman in her mid-60s in Šipovo, the town where she lived most of her life. Šipovo was a "mixed" town—the majority of population was ethnically Serb (roughly 80 percent), with a significant presence of Bosniaks (around 18 percent) and some others (primarily Croats and Yugoslavs). This "mixed" town's habitus, in which different ethnic groups intermingled for centuries, was typical of Bosnia-Herzegovina and socialist Yugoslavia at large.⁶

Zemka's was one of those Bosniak families that were forced out of their home during the early stages of the war.⁷ At the beginning of the war Zemka's only son, Edin, was serving his mandatory duty in the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), and was sent to eastern Bosnia, where he escaped the JNA ranks and joined the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Several years later, Edin was killed by the Serb paramilitaries in Srebrenica, the notorious site of Bosnian genocide. The news of this enormous loss caught Zemka's family crippled by the war: Zemka's daughters, after several years of refugee life, and encouraged by their parents to leave the war-ridden Bosnia, ended up in Germany, together with hundreds of thousands of other refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Zemka's husband passed away during their refugee saga. Zemka, left alone, with her former house now firmly incorporated into the territory and structures of the "Republika Srpska" (the Serb Republic), found herself living in Bijelo Brdo,⁸ a mixed Serb-Muslim town not far from Bihać, away from both her daughters and her extended family which was scattered between Šipovo and the rest of the world. In Bijelo Brdo, she was visited everyday by a retired Serb nurse who regularly changed Zemka's bandages. Even though no one at "Vitalis" knew for sure how Zemka ended up in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the final years of her life vividly capture the contemporary contradictions of postwar state, family and care, as Lidija's words powerfully illustrate: "How ironic – to be a refugee expelled by the Serbs, to have your son killed by them, and then to end up all by yourself, in an unfamiliar town, cared by a Serb women. Nobody knows what awaits them." With her health rapidly deteriorating, Zemka was eventually transferred to the largest regional hospital in Bihać. As Zemka's body was progressively deteriorating, her daughters found themselves in a situation

⁶ The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a federation of six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia (with two autonomous regions Kosovo and Vojvodina), Montenegro, and Macedonia. It emerged from the WWII under the leadership of its charismatic communist leader, Josip Broz Tito and his ideology of Brotherhood and Unity – the official policy of inter-ethnic relations that proposed that all Yugoslav "nations and nationalities" (*narod* and *narodnosti*) should peacefully coexist and nurture the notion of intermarriage and cross-ethnic affiliation.

⁷ Bosnia-Herzegovina became an independent state on April 6, 1992. On the same day that Bosnia-Herzegovina was officially recognized, Serbian paramilitary units and Yugoslav People's Army (*Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija* or JNA) attacked Bosnia's capital, Sarajevo, and initiated a war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The army of the self-proclaimed Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Republika Srpska* or RS) within Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the help of men and weapons from Serbia, succeeded in ethnically cleansing, thus brutally unmixing, intertwined communities and lives (Hayden 1996), and conquering close to 70% of the country's territory by the end of 1993. It also perpetrated some of the most brutal acts of violence exercised against the non-Serb populations, including Zemka's family.

⁸ Bijelo Brdo is a pseudonym.

typical of many other Bosnians and Herzegovinians living in a war-produced diaspora, looking for a solution to their transnational problem – taking care of their aging parents and other family members at a distance. These processes unveiled a “collective scandal”⁹ and a tender zone of cultural intimacy (Herzfeld 2005): the growing inability of the state and family in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina to take care of their elderly.

Postsocialist realities: the semi-absent state and family¹⁰

Starting in the 1950s, socialist Yugoslavia developed a prolific yet decentralized web of republic-based professional bodies responsible for providing social protection (Zaviršek and Leskošek 2005: 39). The infrastructure of Yugoslav social work was rather developed and implemented mostly through a wide network of local Centers for Social Work as well as through the “traditional long-stay residential institutions for children and adults” (Stubbs and Maglajlić 2007: 1177). While the parameters of social protection varied across the Yugoslav’s six republics, in all of them the social welfare system included some elements of the socialist self-management, *Bismarckianism*, and the engagement of a number of non-state actors, such as religious institutions (Stubbs and Maglajlić 2007: 1176).

As a result of these coordinates of “socialist humanism” (see, among others, Cohen and Marković 1975; Horvat 1982), the Yugoslav state, and the socialist state more broadly, was experienced as paternalistic (Manning 2007) or imagined “as a caring parent that provided for its citizen-children” (Dunn 2008: 247; see also Verdery 1996). This representation of the caring state created expectations about what the state should deliver (Dunn 2008): the supreme duty of the state, as “the big father” (Zaviršek and Leskošek 2005: 40) was to “take care of the society as whole”, the process that, according to socialist ideology, would eventually lead to the termination of the need for social help in general, since everyone would be taken care of.¹¹ In order to achieve this, the Yugoslav state, through large scale technologies of regulation, started to collect information and thus engage in the control of biological conditions of its population. As a result, “the government became responsible for living conditions of the people “from the birth until the grave” (‘od kolijevke pa do groba’) (Zaviršek and Leskošek 2005: 46). In harmony with the rest of its citizen-care policies, the socialist health care system provided universal medical assistance and it was defined as “rational, progressive and scientific” (Read 2007: 204). These “universal” entitlements to social security and healthcare were central to socialist modernity and the means through which the socialist state demonstrated that it cared for its citizens (Read 2007: 203). The Yugoslav people’s response to these socialism-produced novelties was a combination of “enthusiasm and hope, mixed with fear and suspicion” (Zaviršek and Leskošek 2005: 46).

While the state extended its control and management of populations to almost all domains of citizen-care, when it came to the care of old people, the state had a strong commitment to avoid creating separate (medical) environments that would solely focus on the elderly (Sokolovsky et al. 1991: 322). Rather, the decentralized socialist system focused on

⁹ I am grateful to Larisa Jašarević for this phrase.

¹⁰ Parts of this section will also appear in A. Hromadžić. Forthcoming 2016. “Affective labor: work, love, and care for the elderly in Bihać” in Brković, Č., V. Čelebičić and S. Jansen, eds. *Negotiating Social Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Farnham: Ashgate.

¹¹ Of course, not “everyone” was equally deserving of the government’s protection and help. Zaviršek and Leskošek (2005: 47–49) explain how the government divided its people into “deserving” and “undeserving”, or “ours” and “not-ours”, where the latter were mostly former owners of shops, factories, and banks, and some Jewish survivors, who were all expropriated by the new socialist government.

the creation of comprehensive primary care services and health centers associated with local “self-managing communities of interest (...) originating in the homes of people’s health (*‘domovi narodnog zdravlja’*)” (Sokolovsky et al. 1991: 322). In addition, different republics within Yugoslavia showed a varied distribution of the centers of elderly: in 1987 Croatia was leading the way with the highest number (120) of special residencies for the elderly (*Dom umirovljenika* – “home for retired persons”) while Belgrade, the capital of Serbia and the former Yugoslavia, had only 2 of these centers (Sokolovsky et al. 1991: 321). These discrepancies are reflections of different historical and infrastructural influences, and of more recent demographic trends: for example, Croatia has seen a more developed infrastructure for the care of elderly while Serbia has harbored the largest number of orphan-care facilities.¹² In addition, rural Croatia witnessed a heavy out-migration of the young, who could not take care of their elderly parents (Sokolovsky et al. 1991: 321), showing again a strong socio-cultural link between the state, family, and eldercare.

The paternalistic relationships and self-projections of the Yugoslav state and its citizens, and the “structures of feeling” (Williams 1977) they enticed relied heavily on traditional approaches to family care, however. For example, conventionally, Bosnians, especially Bosnian women, took care of their elderly family members. Similar to many East European countries where the state projected an image of a caring state, in reality “the private sphere of kinship, friends and personal networks became the focus for emotionally inflicted and socially embedded care” (Read 2007: 206). Until recently, elderly Bosnians were physically and emotionally cared for by their children and they were often expected to live with (at least) one of them, usually the youngest son and his family. These expectations were based on the cultural notions that stress the communal nature of kinship and symbiotic relationship between generations (Simić 1990: 97). The legal system incorporated this cultural expectation as well: for example, Article 150 of the former Yugoslav Constitution defined the care of the elderly as children’s responsibility (Tomorad and Galoguža 1984: 306) and Article 190/10 stated: “Members of the family shall have the duty and right to maintain parents (...) and to be maintained by them, as an expression of their family solidarity” (see Sokolovsky et al. 1991: 321). These legal rights and institutionalized expectations of family care were not always legally enforced,¹³ however, but they still continued to shape the vernacular understandings and responsibilities of care, apparent in Lidija’s comment: “where were they until now?”, implying that Zemka’s daughters should not expect the state to do “their job” – take care of their fragile mother. Due to the war-produced exile, many families could not fulfill these expectations of care at proximity, thus triggering a major reshuffling of the postwar and postsocialist assemblage of care, and, in the process, revealing many raptures, ideologies and myths about delivering care, past and present.

With the postwar state in pieces and families in fragments, “the crisis of care” in Bosnia-Herzegovina became ubiquitous and it revealed the conflicting ideologies and expectations of care: on the one side, the state projected an image of caregiving but relied on family to care for the elderly, while, on the other side, families did most of caregiving, but still embodied an ideology of the paternalistic state. These conflicting expectations and impossibilities to fulfil their real and imagined former roles revealed the cracks in the ideology of responsibility and caused multiple affective reactions and accusations of failure. The family, just like the state, thus emerged as semi-absent; materially present (they pay for the substantial private

¹² Paul Stubbs, personal communication, October 17, 2014.

¹³ Tomorad and Galoguža argue that regardless of the legal right to be taken care of by their offspring, the elderly very rarely used these means to secure these rights, since the emotional basis of the relationship was not present. The authors also argue that children were sometimes materially unable to support their parents (1984: 306, n1).

nursing care expenses)¹⁴ and physically far away (unavailable to deliver love and care at close proximity). And yet, regardless of the postwar state's progressive withdrawal from biopolitics – the postwar state is both bureaucratically omnipresent and biopolitically absent/increasingly withdrawn from citizen-care – Zemka's daughters still had an expectation that the state would at least help them, since they were "family of the martyr" (*šehidska porodica*). In other words, the postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina, the daughters believed, had a "moral debt" (Han 2012: 4) toward Zemka's family, for the highest sacrifice the family had given to the state in blood, to protect its very existence during the war. When this moral debt was not honored, but neglected by the state – in this case the cantonal hospital in Bihać – the daughters felt a deep sense of betrayal, injustice, and, finally, anger. These competing expectations of care and reciprocity between the postwar state and its most deserving subjects – the martyr's family – thus created a void filled with potent diasporic citizen disappointment and Zemka's neglected, bruised old body. I interpret this topography of Zemka's body – suffering, bruised, blood-stained and swollen – as an embodied symbol of the state's and family's semi-absences as they powerfully collapse into the body of an elderly woman in contemporary Bosnia. Zemka's experience is a powerful reflection of these semi-absences which are deeply embodied, painfully tangible and indicative of changing and differential "pedagogies of attention" (Cohen 2008: 337).

Conclusion

Zemka's moving story of life and death in the Balkans illustrates the effects of semi-absent state and family on the country's elderly. This family's experiences are both unique in their intimate struggles, pains and wounds, and yet, in many ways, similar to most others. This is the story of war displacement and destruction of lives, bodies and objects; the weakening, semi-absence and reformation of the postwar and postsocialist state; families fragmented across continents; new homes and borders, and shifting terrains and expectations of life and death, and care and responsibility.

The majority of people I encountered in Bosnia-Herzegovina share some of the experiences and sentiments revealed in Zemka's story: they frequently complain about their poor health, the declining health of their family and friends, premature deaths of many friends and acquaintances, the crumbling and shrinking medical and social systems of care, and about the growing burden of social, moral and economic debt left in the wake of these changes. These processes, experiences and stories shape lives and deaths of people in the Balkans, but they also point at the need to bring into conversation that what scholarship in the region has treated as separate: postwar and postsocialist regimes of citizen care; failed responsibility and expectations that generate the emerging privatized spaces of differential care. It is exactly these uneven, simultaneously local, regional, and transnational configurations of love, care, and abandonment that produce unique, idiosyncratic, and seemingly contradictory yet intimately interwoven experiences of past and future, presence and absence, politics and affect, and hope and betrayal in contemporary Bosnia and beyond.

¹⁴ Private care for elderly is very expensive in relation to the Bosnian standard of living. The monthly fee is between 750 and 1050 Bosnian Convertible Marks (KM) (approximately 380-535 €) – a sum too high for the majority of the country's older inhabitants, who receive an average monthly pension of 350-400 KM (178-204 €). The family members who work all over the world can only sporadically visit their aging parents and relatives, but they are, in most instances, committed to paying for their expensive (in local terms) care.

C

OMMENTS

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Placing the dislocated fragments of broken bodies, states, and families

Azra Hromadžić's article is a masterful example of ethnography that moves between the seemingly distant and the seemingly near, revealing, in the process, that neither was ever what it had seemed. There is Zemka, more than a bruised and bloodied body, more than a socially abandoned victim, but a point of translation, where the affective reality of far-away others becomes decoded, interpreted, and given value. Taking a step back from the question of how care and abandonment are enacted and what kind of effects they have on the topography of power/knowledge of post-war Bosnia, we might ask in the first place why anyone should care at all, especially when such care is bound to be fraught with complications and contradictions? Why should her family, in "war-produced exile" in Germany (Hromadžić, this issue), care that Zemka has a place in a care home? Why should a distant relative drive hours to deliver her there despite his weak sense of attachment to her? Why should the state care for older citizens like Zemka?

Expectations about who should care, why they should care, and what constitutes good care produces a tense atmosphere of fragile bonds, unstable and uncertain alliance. Although like older people elsewhere, Zemka's aging body and mind makes her too cumbersome to move very far, her placelessness drags her along from one institution to the next. She is not mobile, autonomous, self-reliant, able to choose, to risk. Age and disability alone are not enough to explain Zemka's vulnerability; it is inseparable from the politics of care emerging in post-socialist, post-war Bosnia and elsewhere as the world continues to grow older.

Hromadžić vividly describes Zemka's ageing "topography," the trail of broken relationships and betrayals that simultaneously mark both her care and her abandonment, as "an embodied symbol of the state's and family's semi-absences" (Hromadžić, this issue). Here Hromadžić's work makes its boldest contribution, articulating with ethnographic work on care in other contexts, such as Lisa Stevenson's *Life beside Itself* (2013), Anne Allison's *Precarious Japan* (2013), Giordano (2014) *Practices of Translation and the Making of Migrant Subjectivities in Contemporary Italy*, and my own work in *Aging and Loss* (Danely 2014). In each of these cases the semi-absence of state and family leaves vulnerable subjects in suspense (Choy and Zee 2015) – the conditions of life are uncertain and contingent, broken by the dislocations like war and the violence of care (cf. Wool 2015). As Hromadžić's interlocutor, Lidija remarks, "Nobody knows what awaits them" (Hromadžić, this issue).

Perhaps Zemka's dementia is the appropriate way of inhabiting this space of suspension. It allows her the comfort of believing that her son, whom she is unaware died in the war years earlier, will take her to Amerika, providing her with both a place and a family. Zemka's symp-

toms appear to reconcile one set of dislocations (moving from the hospital to the care home, her daughter's move from Bosnia to Germany, the son's move from life to death) with another (from present to non-present, from Bosnia to Amerika, from neglect to care). Zemka too, embodies a semi-absence.

The condition of suspense catches not only the older person herself, but her carers as well. There appears to be no solid ground of justice or even an ethic of care to steady them. This is familiar from my own work with carers in Japan, and while I am often asked which is better, care by the family or by an institution, I know that the answer is never straightforward. In Japan, as in the conditions that Hromadžić describes, the family is not a stable and cohesive unit tightly bound by a uniform pattern of kinship, nor is the state and the care system centralized and rational. Both family and the state are better approached as "assemblages" (Hromadžić, this issue) that produce and uneven and contradictory terrain of (dis)engagement.

Hromadžić's article (this issue) asks us to imagine a "state in pieces and families in fragments". Care by the state here cannot be opposed to care by the family, nor can care be easily characterized by mutuality or "plurality" – terms that imply an affective and political adjustment of subjectivity in order to adhere to ethical virtues. The family who care about Zemka's welfare are not physically present, yet the caregivers who are present also seem not to care. The semi-absences are also semi-recognitions of the subject of care. What mediates the semi-recognition (money, influence, ethnicity, e.g.) and how are these reinterpreted in a way that transforms their value in the context of care for the elderly? What should one do to a subject that can only be partially recognized? What is the moral responsibility of family or the state in such matters? That is, who holds responsibility for the violence inflicted on Zemka that eventually precipitated her death? These are largely empirical questions, but they are, I believe, important if we are to follow Hromadžić's line of thought and attempt to apply it in other settings.

Finally, Hromadžić's ethnography opens up a critical space to question the degree to which we are ever fully present to others. Are the semi-absences she describes always present in care relationships, and particularly inter-generational relationships? Is this qualitatively different, one might ask, than the condition of alterity that we as anthropologists face in our writing about others? While Zemka's richly aesthetic narrative pulls me in emotionally, for example, I am also faced with the fact of my own semi-absence towards her own condition. And so reading this kind of work has seized me as well, suspended me in the present-absence of mourning for a woman whose life I must believe to be meaningful, evocative, productive. If the notion of semi-absence is to be expanded further, it might benefit most by more explicitly addressing and incorporating aspects of violence, mourning, and narrative (cf. Das 2006; Jackson 2014), in ways that could further illuminate the challenge our understandings of age.

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Public is (also) individual

The introductory article by Azra Hromadžić presents a welcome contribution, since it deals with a very important research topic inside ethnological-anthropological studies of the state and its institutions in the region of ex-Yugoslavia and that is the problem of constant diminishing of, and even denying, the responsibility of individuals for their own destiny, including their medical and social welfare. The same approach is also evident in the contemporary anthropological research on the link between economy, politics and culture. Having in mind a low level of urbanization before the establishment of the communist-socialist state which “cares” and a chaotic mixture of three types of state and social organizations which have preceded it (foreign colonial monarchy which combined feudalism and early company capitalism, local monarchy with regional ambitions which combined kinship-based communitarianism with early state capitalism and a local variant of sharia feudalism with the elements of late slavery), where individualistic culture was almost non-existent, the countries of ex-Yugoslavia present a textbook example for the analysis of the concepts of the community and individual and of their mutual potential as well as responsibility. This is specially the case with the transitional/postsocialist destinies of the citizens of ex-Yugoslav societies. While living in the region in which the external or internal Other was deemed responsible/guilty both for collective and individual destinies, the citizens of ex-Yugoslav republics, including Bosna which is the main topic of the leading article, rarely got any systematic incentive, except for rare liberal¹⁵ attempts, to develop as responsible individuals who consciously bear the consequences and take credits for their actions or the lack of them. Hence the introductory article tackles a very important topic even though it approaches it in an ideologically biased way, which is legitimate in critical anthropology, since it opts for, lately quite common, left-oriented anthropological criticism of the degradation of the welfare/social security/state and the reduction in the scope and the level of services included in the tax-financed social benefits, attributed to “liberalism”.

Using the standard combination of arguments on the crisis of the welfare state which she juxtaposes with the informants’ narratives, the author tells the story – and frames it theoretically when necessary – about the ethnographic research which can inform, supplement, but also negate standard explanations of transition processes in postsocialist societies. However, the author failed to notice the methodological trap one might fall into when placing the ethnographic focus on personal narratives: a) the trap of nostalgia, especially present in post-Yugoslav societies, maybe primarily in Bosnian society and b) the trap of adopting the ethno-explicative, hence the knowledge which is through its own definition inferior, to expert ethnological-anthropological scientific knowledge. Those two methodological traps significantly steered the conclusion towards the responsibility of the state and not the responsibility of an individual and didn’t take into account the actions (nationalisation, expro-

¹⁵ The social life of the term “liberal” could be a good starting point not only for an anthropological debate, but also for a multilateral project, having in mind the significance of socio-cultural change which was the result of the transition of the political and economic systems of the ex-Yugoslav states and societies during the last few decades. Here I use the term “liberal” in its original meaning – appreciation of individual freedoms – not in the American sense of the word (meaning “socialism”), nor the Balkan sense of the word (“antisocialism”).

priation, confiscation, forced illegal taxation, lack of saving and investment schemes) and the lack of them (surrendering one's own destiny to the collective, justifying one's lack of concern for the future by real or alleged deficits of the system) *before* the onset of the old age.¹⁶

Furthermore, the author failed to offer, which is otherwise quite common in the anthropological studies of post-socialism, the analysis of the situation which preceded the current devastation of the social welfare state. What lacks is the description of the (im)possibility of communism/real socialism to fulfil its promises and especially the analysis of the reasons whether it was capable of doing it anyway, structurally speaking (besides the redistribution of capital which was accumulated by individuals or companies, combined by accruing debt). What lacks in this article and which would be worth a discussion or a repeated/more detailed research, is the discrepancy between informant's nostalgic narratives on pre-capitalist social care and the scientific truth which is available from the sources and expert analyses. There is also a lack of a more grounded reference to the existing, even though scarce, literature on aging, pensions and insurance, especially on organized care of elderly in Yugoslav context as the key concept behind the proposed argument. A more detailed research could offer a coherent periodization and contextualisation of changes in public gerontology system after the breakup of the socialist state, having in mind the fact that the socialist state was systematically taking from its citizens their earnings, which they could therefore not invest in pensions and insurance funds, simultaneously creating within them a dependence on the economically unsustainable public system of social care, with catastrophic consequences for certain individuals, especially those who were not able to create their own networks of social support during transition years. In that sense, it would be not only academically interested but also socially useful if the author would more precisely define the processes which she mentioned, name the agents of the incomplete reforms she referred to and match the type of analysis with the conclusion she offered, having in mind that her conclusions – generalized and prone to discussion – lack proper argumentation which would follow from the presented analysis. The author did not prove, she only assumed that the system of social care, especially care of elderly in ex-Yugoslavia and Bosnia especially was a) functional and b) that any similar system was sustainable in contemporary Bosnia.

The article definitively presents a contribution to the widening of the debate on the impact of socio-cultural changes, including economic and legal, on the conceptualization of the role of the state in the life of individuals. This debate is indeed necessary in post-Yugoslav ethnologies/anthropologies, especially having in mind the tendency of the anthropologists to join neo-collectivist anti-liberal movements for which we know, as history taught us, that they, in general, provoke fascism in our societies and can represent a Weimarian introduction to new wars, criminal redistribution of private property and destruction of public in the name of the collective. It is exactly this confusion between public and collective, and which is also present in this article, that I suggest for a future debate, if there would ever occur such an opportunity.

¹⁶ This, of course, does not refer to the situations in which the war victims were forced to preserve their own lives and therefore could not worry in advance about the quality of life during their later years. Except for those individuals who were directly affected by the war, the argument presented in the introductory article referred to all the people who lived in Yugoslav societies in the last decades and this is the problem I am accentuating here. This argument, as presented, could not refer to all of us and it could not be used as a basis for understanding/justifying the positions of any individuals, except for those who were the direct victims of the war.

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“We could use a care home, but it would be a scandal to leave your parents there, a big disgrace!” Formal and informal care for the elderly in Croatia

From the end of the 20th century and during the first decades of the 21st century, in Europe in general there is an increasing insecurity as to how to deal with social and economic changes and the consequences of population aging on the demographic structure of societies. Taking into account the rapid aging of the population and an increasing number of older persons who (for longer periods) live alone and in their later age need assistance from the third parties, the scientific attention is focused on (economically) sustainable and (socially) required types and modalities of care. The scientists are trying to answer the question whether numerous older persons are becoming a (too)heavy burden for the contemporary family (which is still the main provider of the informal care) and for the state whose economic power is increasingly diminishing (which is the provider of the formal types of care) (Sundström and Johansson 2005; Podgorelec and Klempić 2007). Are there changes in the societal expectations from individual family members, especially women, as the main providers of care (taking into account their working careers) and in the level of intergenerational solidarity of the members? Are there changes in the expectations that the older people have as to who should be the main care provider? What are the implications of the increased commercialization of care for the quality of life of the elderly?

The comparison of the data from the last three censuses points to the fact that “the population of Croatia is characterized by rapid aging and high levels of agedness” (Nejašmić and Toskić 2013: 92) and according to the average age of 41.7 years (2011), Croatia “belongs to the group of European countries with the highest level of population agedness” (Živić, Turk and Pokos 2014: 248). Increase in the overall percentage of people at 65 years of age and older and the increase of the percentage of the oldest group of the elderly (80 and older), with both groups including the highest number of people with medical problems who require tending and care, represent a big challenge for medical systems, systems of social welfare and pension system, especially in the rural regions where institutional and non-institutional care is much less developed as compared to the urban parts of the country.

My commentary on Azra Hromadžić’s introductory article on the “crisis of care” for the elderly in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the second decade of the 2000s, is a kind of a supplement to the topics the author mentioned in which the author mentioned certain problems and data related to the care of the elderly in Croatia. More precisely, on the basis of the research conducted mostly in the rural regions of Croatia, we will try to present some patterns of care for the elderly in Croatia and point to the changes in the expectations of the potential care recipients towards the care givers.

Migrations – mitigating circumstance to the providers of informal care

The populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia of all generations, younger and older alike, share the consequences of the periods of joint history which have significantly

influenced their contemporary way of life. For the majority of individuals (families), the consequences were, first of all, multiple losses which are visible in the decline of the economic power (often resulting in poverty), the change in the quality of social networks (mostly their narrowing) and the changes in social norms and basic values (on the level of the state, local community and family). Taking into account the rapid tempo of aging of one or both societies, the problems related to the way of life of a contemporary family and the reasons for the changes in the attitude of the community and the state towards elderly care, also have to be analysed in the context of migrations. Namely, a large percentage of population in their most productive years and especially in the period since the end of the 1960s, participated in the migrations instigated mostly by economic reasons. In the last 25 years, those were augmented by numerous voluntary or forced migrations the reasons for which were, first of all, the break-up of the common state and the war (during the 1990s), led on the territories of both countries, as well as politic, economic and social consequences of the war, crimes against civilians and different forms of (usually economic) crime. All the above mentioned reasons could be clearly observed in the changes of the conditions surrounding the care for elderly people in both states.

Public policies in Croatia are quite prone to mask the problems linked to the aging of population and care of the elderly who are in need of tending and care, by equating those problems with (too) large a ratio of the number of the retired people over the number of the employed people, which presents an unsurmountable financial burden for the economy of societies undergoing crisis. Among retired people in Croatia, as well as in other transition states of ex-Yugoslavia, there is a large percentage of those who left the labour market long before the age limit for their retirement (60 or 65 years of age), i.e. before they crossed from the period of late maturity to early old age. An increasing number of (even young) retired people was primarily the consequence of the transition from the planned to market economy and the transformation of the type of ownership which accompanied that change, secondly the consequence of the war and its aftermath as well as the consequence of a several decades of erroneous economic politics.

Hromadžić, with her debate on the aspects of (inadequate) presence of the state in care for elderly and through the title of the article itself, "Where were they until now?" accentuates the severity of the consequences of transformation of Bosnian and Herzegovinian society, especially on the level of family relations. Family and local community in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia since the 1990s have been facing different types of mainly negative influences. For example, the (im)possibility of employment, loss of a large number of jobs and high unemployment of young people (the cause of increased poverty levels of large number of people in both countries), changes in the structure of family which is the main care provider for all its members (smaller number of children, increased number of the elderly), significant emigration of young people, especially from rural areas and after Croatia's ascension to the European Union (allowing Croatian citizens to find jobs in some EU countries), from urban areas also. The experience of migration causes changes in the way of life of the members of families who participate in migration but also in the expectations of those, usually older members, who are left behind. In the context of population migration which was the consequence of war, a certain percentage of population, both Croats and Serbs, after the peaceful reintegration, i.e. after the infrastructural renovation of the destroyed objects and houses, did not return to Croatia. "Because of the long-term exile and refugee status a part of the population (...), especially young people adapted to the life in the new setting and did not want to return..." (Klempić Bogadi and Lajić 2014: 448). Hence, most of those

who returned were older and the research confirmed that “almost 30% of the returnees were older than 65 years of age”, while with respect to the quality of life [and the possibility of obtaining any type of informal care], especially endangered were the single-person households with the average age of 70 (Mesić and Bagić 2011: 85–87). A large number of the returnees returned to the underdeveloped, peripheral rural regions with insufficient health care and other forms of formal care almost completely missing.

Organization of formal care – presence of state

Hromadžić outlined that from all the countries in the ex-state, Croatia had the widest network of institutional care for elderly citizens. What happened with that system today? According to the data of the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth for 2015, institutional accommodation for older citizens of Croatia is organized in 226 care homes (including state and county homes and an increasing number of care homes of different founders and legal entities which provide care without care home facilities, such as NGOs, religious communities, etc.). Care homes today take care for 17 536¹⁷ people. Comparing those data with data of ten years ago,¹⁸ we could see a continual development of the network of institutional care (especially the number of commercial types of accommodation) as well as a rising number (percentage)¹⁹ of older citizens placed in care homes. Alongside institutional organization, equally important, especially in the rural regions, is the organization of the non-institutional types of care and according to the data for 2015, 5 655²⁰ of elderly people were placed in the family care and foster care homes.

Intergenerational solidarity – presence of family members

For older people in rural regions in which a high level of activity is preserved until a very old age²¹ (Podgorelec 2008; Podgorelec and Klempić Bogadi 2013; Klempić Bogadi and Podgorelec 2014), and in which the main expectations of the people still are that, when the times comes, the care of the aged member of the family would be provided primarily by the spouse and then the children (the largest number of whom has moved away and live in other parts of Croatia or abroad) or some other member of the closer family, what is extremely important is this provision of help and care in old people's homes.²² Some non-institutional programs have proved to be very efficient, such as “Help in homes for the elderly” and “Day care and help in home for elderly” which included another 15 550 of old people, mostly in rural, frequently isolated and severely depopulated areas of Croatia. One such programme is realized through employing geronto-attendants which daily visit the homes of older people. Pilot program was introduced to the small islands in Šibenik Archipelago. Mostly it included

¹⁷ What makes up to 2.31% of the total population of the elderly.

¹⁸ According to the data of the Ministry of Health and Social Policy, at the end of 2006, 12 233 old people were placed in care homes which amounts to 1.8% of the people of 65 years of age and older.

¹⁹ Increase in the percentage is even more significant if we take into account the aging of total population.

²⁰ Or 0.75% of the total population of the old people, which together with those people placed in care homes, amounts to over 3% of total population of the elderly.

²¹ Which often means that the need for care by others arrives later in life and lasts for shorter periods of time (Sundström and Johansson 2005).

²² Organized help and care, according to 2015 data, is provided for 5 083 older citizen of Croatia in their own homes.

old people living in single person households, those with need of medical attention or with lesser functional capabilities, of very old age, with no children or with the children who migrated (Podgorelec and Klempić Bogadi 2013). The staff of the Šibenik Centre for Help and Care concluded that in the last six years, the majority of the older citizens who were provided services in their own homes remained living on the islands till very old age (average between 75 and 80), were longer functionally capable and were more independent than the people of the same age living in the town.

Expectations of the (potential) recipients of care

Have the above mentioned social changes influenced the attitudes of the potential care recipients and also care providers? A gradual change in the expectations as to who, alongside the family, should be the active provider of care at old age is a reflection of the changes in lifestyle of the new generations. When speaking about rural areas which were severely affected by war or about peripheral areas of small Croatian islands, the difficult economic situation, financial impoverishment of people and insufficient number of institutions for social and health care for the elderly as well as inadequate (or non-existent) organization of non-institutional care still require a strong intergenerational solidarity of parents and their children (Podgorelec 2008; Knodel et al. 2010; Heylen 2010; Klempić Bogadi and Podgorelec 2011). One of my interlocutors (M, 75), referring to his potential helplessness, said: "Am I afraid of the old age? I'm counting on my children, I hope. I'm lucky to have them!"

Intergenerational support is expressed through joint activities, love and help in the form of money and services. A number of my informants in their middle and late middle age still felt that the responsibility of taking care of their elderly parents was exclusively theirs and because of that reason a number of individuals decided, even before their retirement in the cities (to which they moved because of education and/or employment), to return to their island villages to take care of their parents (Podgorelec and Klempić Bogadi 2013).

While younger family members (grown up children) more readily accept the possibility that the state (institutions) could partially be involved in providing help, service and care when they can't²³ (or couldn't), the older people still expect the care to be provided by the members of their immediate family and hence some of them said: "Once families used to care for their elders while today, what a disgrace, a stranger in some care home is supposed to take care of you" (M, 82 yrs) or "[Once] we didn't need care homes, since young people lived together with the oldies" (Ž, 87). Help is primarily expected from the spouses and grown up children and after that from other family members, friends and neighbours (Sundström and Johansson 2005; Podgorelec 2008). However, the way of life of an increasing number of old people who live alone and their children don't live nearby, brings about a gradual change in the attitudes about the expectations as to who should be the care provider and the institutional accommodation or some other form of non-institutional care are becoming increasingly acceptable:

There are a lot of old people. But there is nobody who is not cared for. If people are really old, then they have an old people's home, those who have no one. There are elderly, but none who is not taken care of, so to say. (F, 86)

²³ Many left their villages and towns, as was the case with Zemka and her family. Here the reason for migrating is not the focus of our research, even though it is not irrelevant, but the fact that the older people are more frequently left alone.

Firstly, I'm happy that the dear Lord is looking after me and my health. But tomorrow, look here, you fall into bed and who's gonna do it? Children are far away! (M, 77)

The best things is "there's no place like home", or as the proverb says, there is no place like home, yes, if that's possible. But for me it's not possible. No neighbours, nothing, what am I to do all alone? (F, 94)

People who belong to the age group of younger elderly notice a gradual change in the expectations towards institutional care as compared to earlier generations:

People consider old people's home as the last stage in their lives. But I think it is wrong to see it that way, I think you should be happy that you can finish your life in a decent way... it used to be a disgrace, but now it's not so much anymore. It's better to be there safe, then to be home alone where something can happen to a person. Because now when there are no young people anymore, there is no one to take care... I don't know, but my mum always said: "Hope you are not going to place me in an old people's home." That generation did not accept that. (F, 67)

Instead of a conclusion

Informal care is still the main form of providing care for the older people in Croatia. Single person households are increasingly frequent in rural areas of Croatia which are also the regions with the poorest distribution of any form of formal care for the elderly. For older people who live alone and who don't have a family member close enough to them as to provide support and help when necessary, the most acceptable formal type of help or care is the one they can get in their own homes. Children, on the other hand, who, together with the spouses, are still the main providers of care, and their aged parents, also, want to have the opportunity of choosing some forms of organized (formal) care provided by the state which is, due to the economic shortages, increasingly incapable of providing that care.

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Abandonment and/or relatedness: few thoughts on kinship, aging and transformations

Azra Hromadžić in her text uses an ethnographic case study for her analysis and interpretation. The main plot is short, but ethnographically rich, a family situation in which an 80 year old woman, a widow and a mother of four, of three grown up living daughters and one

²⁴Tihana Rubić conducted this research as part of the project "City-making: space, culture and identity", financed by the Croatian Science Foundation (No. 2350).

son who was killed in the last Bosnian war, was being transferred from the hospital care to a private care home in which she died after a few days, already extremely ill when she arrived. After her death, the daughters, who haven't been living in Bosnia since they left as refugees during the 1990s and who now live in Germany, arrive to the home and in an emotionally disturbing debate, voice their disappointment and shock with the Bosnian health care which, immediately after providing basic medical help in a public hospital, discharged the old woman, keeping her for only one day and not a day more.

This family situation, documented through observation and interview with the interested parties, is a relevant example for the analysis and interpretation of family, social and political relations. The author discusses social values linked with the state and family as the institutions providing care for the elderly as well as social expectations reflected, for example, in the commentary of the manager of the private care home spoken to the researcher and referring to the members of the family of the deceased old woman: "Where were they until now?" This story shows that a life situation can be a trigger for consequential conflicting family and social relations. The retold story is a very illustrative ethnographic example, since it contains intimate and multi-layered data on opinions, actions and values.

Aging – as an experience and a concept – has been insufficiently researched and problematized in ethnology and cultural anthropology. We think that the experience of aging is by no means universal, even though there are certain "general" transformations linked with the older generation in a broader context: for example, today's demographic and socio-political challenges such as the aging of population or prolonged life span, the crisis of social security and of "classical" pension and family systems. Here we could also list various regional challenges of an increased number of old people who live alone (as is the case in China in the recent years), as well as (for example in the United States) the existence of a morally questionable politics of distribution of health care resources explicitly on the basis of age (with older people being deprived), etc.

In the context of the significance of all those and other processes linked to aging, we consider the contribution by Azra Hromadžić to be ethnographically extremely relevant. However, in the following paragraphs of our commentary we point to certain problems in analysis and interpretation.

Ethnological and cultural-anthropological interpretations which are formed on the basis of individual examples can frequently fall into a "trap" when the interpretation based on an anecdotal example is used in a broader context. The author in this article, as she emphasized in her introduction, discusses and problematizes care for the elderly in wartime and post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a diachronic perspective, her interpretations and data refer to socialist, post-socialist and contemporary periods and in one segment the author even refers to pre-socialist period – when she interprets the characteristics of the institution of "traditional" family, its inner relations and values.

By contrasting the two main periods – socialist – when, according to the author, formal-institutional care for the elderly existed and postsocialist, wartime and post-war – when those earlier forms of care, as author claimed, faced a crisis and gradually disappeared, the author interpreted the ethnographic case study which is the focus of her article as if the "destiny" of this old woman in postsocialist and post-war context, as it happened, was inevitable. In other words, that it was a direct consequence of the degradation of formal-institutional and family patterns of care and support, caused mostly by a very abrupt cut caused by the war in the 1990s, separating families and breaking (direct, physical) bonds: "due to the war-produced exile, many families could not fulfil those expectations of care at proximity, thus triggering a

major reshuffling of the post-war and postsocialist assemblage of care..." (Hromadžić, this issue).

Even though this thesis can seem familiar, it demands a more complex questioning of the macro-processes, among others, of those which occurred during the 20th century in the area of social security – those provided by the state and those provided by the family – and their mutual relationship. Care for the elderly in socialism and care for the elderly in postsocialist/post-war period were presented in the text as two completely opposing frameworks generally characterized by discontinuities. The war had undoubtedly caused many wounds, changes and suffering. Numerical data additionally confirm this claim – in the last war it was estimated that on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina “around 100 000 people have been lost, while around 2 700 000 have become displaced” (Grbić Jakopović 2011: 317–318). In many European countries the wave of immigration of refugees and displaced persons from Bosnia was significant during that period and a Finn anthropologist Laura Huttunen wrote on transformations in social and ethnic structure in Finland during the 1990s, which confirmed the scope of war-related immigration to Finland in that period: “Practically all Bosnians in Finland came there as refugees during or soon after the war in Bosnia, and most of them were either Bosnian Muslims/Bosniaks or with mixed background” (Huttunen 2008: 236). War conflict in the countries of ex-Yugoslavia created a surrounding which “produced maximum insecurity for people of all age groups” (Podgorelec 2008: 31).

However, besides discontinuities, there are also continuities, since people did not “overnight”, on all levels, during the 1990s, start to live according to some new model. Namely, Bosnia and Herzegovina is, just like other countries in the region, traditionally an emigration country (Čapo and Jurčević 2014: 18). Migrations (political, economic...) were a continuum in both its war and peace times. Due to migrations, families were forced to find new mechanisms for their own survival (economic, symbolic, etc.) even in situations when they were not sharing the same physical space. Modern anthropology is now for a long time developing the concepts of dislocation and transnational social spaces – those which “surpass one particular physical place and are realized in the processes of modern migration, dislocation and relocation (Čapo and Gulin Zrnić 2011: 13; cf. Vuorela 2008). Those “spaces” are interpreted more as an adjustment and transformation than as degradation of social (usually family) bonds and relationships:

on the basis of transnational paradigm the researches have started to observe migrants inside transnational social areas which they create between and above interstate borders thus maintaining thick, multiple social relations which link their societies, of origin and destination (...) [Ties and relationships] link two or more spaces and people living in them and there is a circulation of things, money and services between those two spaces located in two states (...). Since this extensive exchange is happening on the level of family and kinship networks and the localities where people live (...) [we can talk about] about parallel multiple levels of social networks. (Čapo and Jurčević 2014: 24)

In the circumstances of constant emigrations, families were facing challenges and changes in family structure, as well as, partly, disintegrations of (“traditional” relations), even before the last war. Disintegration of traditional institutions of, for example, three-generational household, as observed by Norwegian social anthropologist Tone Bringa (2009: 49), was occurring in Bosnia in the decades preceding the 1990s and even in the countries of “Western democracies” (cf. Podgorelec 2008: 31). Those processes were noted in, for example, the first half of the 1970s since “everyday relations were occurring (...) with a higher level of

openness and insecurity" (Podgorelec 2008: 31). In that sense, the emphasized dichotomies socialism-postsocialism, pre-war and post-war context were just one of possible aspects of deep complexities (transformations and continuities) of social (primarily family) relations.

On the other hand, in spite of a generally accepted attitude that socialist period was a period of social "security", there was only a narrow time frame, 1950s and 1960s, which could be called a "golden age" (Grandits 2010: 25) of "security" – welfare state – also in a broader, European, context (ibid.). Since after those decades, until today, there followed a process of destabilization of social and welfare state which was even more accentuated since the late 1980s, especially in the countries with intensive economic-political restructuring, during the transition from socialism to new economic-political system. We would like to emphasize that even during the above mentioned "golden age", the sectors such as housebuilding, health care, industry, social care, etc., on a practical, executive level did not correlate with the discourse: despite of ideology and striving, resources were always modest and limited. Hence the part in which Hromadžić talks about prior sustenance, security and a state which takes care about its citizens, like "the big father", was more about discourse than the practice itself and hence we are of the opinion that the difference between the two contrasted periods mentioned in the text is exaggerated. Finally, family in this context was consequentially always present as a source of support, care and help (social security), of "emotionally inflicted and socially embedded care", both in socialism and post-socialism (cf. Heady 2010; Grandits 2010; Rubić and Leutloff 2015), but, of course, always with inherited discrepancies and challenges.

We would also like to comment shortly on our expectations which stemmed from the author's announcement in the summary, and which pointed to some of our research (for example Rubić 2012), that the text would critically examine and discuss the term "ordinary people", or in Hromadžić's words: "I use 'ordinary people' with much caution in this work. As (...) 'everyday' is where much deeply political work happens". We think that the term "ordinary people" is, before anything else, just a (common) discursive category used in collective ideas and narratives and that it carries implicit meanings and politization potential. However, in the text we have not detected the announced critical approach, just the author's usage of very questionable terms such as: "majority of people", "ordinary people", "ordinary Bosnians".

Whenever there are attempts to interpret certain things on a level broader than just family relations, and such exist in the text, using one family as example, i.e. using contemporary and recent excerpts of family life, they are after all inadequately grounded and require wider ethnographic research of other family and anecdotal stories, which would, at the level of analysis and interpretation, surpass the anecdotal level. Methodologically it is completely legitimate to analyse one case study, but this requires a more extensive study and archival preparation (cf. Vuorela 2008). Having in mind the complexity of the subject matter which is discussed in the article as well as the author's attempt to offer interpretation of the processes and events much broader than a single family case study, we are of the opinion that an interpretative and analytical goal set this way requires additional ethnographic or study material.

The paper would, according to our opinion, benefit from the discussion and problematization of the challenges of emic/etic research position when dealing with "one's own" national, social, cultural, economic and political context as a research topic. On what levels is this position etic and on which it is emic? We should recall Claude Lévi-Strauss's observations on one's own research position in France during the 1950s when he witnessed, together with his fellow citizens at the time, a staged event of the public execution of Santa Claus in Dijon in 1952, an event which embodied political-religious ritual and consumerist-modernizational conflicts of the then French society. Lévi-Strauss wrote:

the facts that take place before our very eyes and whose theatre is our own society are both easier and more difficult to discern. Easier, because we have observed the continuity of experience, together with all its moments and nuances and more difficult because it is during such rare occasions that we realize the utmost complexity of social changes, even those most focused; and because the seeming reason which we ascribe to the events whose agents we are, are very different from the real causes which ascribe us a certain role in those events. (Lévi-Strauss 2014: 15)

In a similar way, analytically and interpretatively, presents her material Tone Bringa when she deals with religious identity of the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1980s. She explicitly positions her case study as *one of* the possible stories and perpetuates this position through the text which we read in a book recently published and translated into Bosnian language:

this is the story about the lives of some (...) people and some aspects of the community in which they lived. Since it occurred at a specific historical moment, it is focused on lives of several typical representatives of one specific rural community at that time. It never aspired to be a story on all that is Bosnia and its people, but it is a detailed study of one ornament on a Bosnian carpet. (Bringa 2009: 3)

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Ageing, transformation and the multiple crises of care in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Azra Hromadžić's important, moving and tragic vignette of Zemka's life and death is an extraordinarily telling account of the multiple crises of care, welfare and ageing in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina. Her understanding of what she terms the "semi-absence" of both the family and the state in the context of post-war and post-communist transitions allows her to uncover patterns, processes, and practices which are almost completely neglected in the vast academic literature on Bosnia and Herzegovina framed in terms of "ethno-nationalism". Her text reveals much more than the "view from above or from nowhere" within a much smaller literature on social policy and social protection in the same country. It is not only that "the services one receives still largely depend on where one lives" (Maglajlić Holiček and Rašidagić 2007: 163) in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina but that, as in this case, Bihać's cantonal hospital, having supposedly "done everything it could", within the constraints it is no doubt under, felt perfectly within its rights to return responsibility to Zemka's family, at very short notice, inducing a major crisis and, no doubt, contributing to Zemka's death.

The crisis of care discussed in the text is, of course, not confined to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Demographic ageing is a European-wide phenomenon with many countries experiencing the combined impacts of three broad processes: increased life expectancy, although not always increases in healthy life expectancy; low fertility and declining birth-rates; and significant out-migration of those of working age. Population decline is, then, often combined with increasing dependency ratios and a rise in both the number and proportion of those aged 80 or over, and of those older persons who live for many years in conditions of ill-health, disabil-

ity, immobility and, indeed, poverty and social exclusion. Demographic changes undermine the sustainability of traditional insurance-based health and social protection systems which have relied on the assumption that adult working age populations will be large enough, employed in sufficient numbers and for a sufficiently long period of time, and paid well enough to contribute towards services and benefits for both children and older people, as well as for adults without work and those with disabilities.

Changing family structures, changing expectations of inter-generational rights and responsibilities, and the dispersion of extended families across sometimes long distances add to the challenges. The changing role of the state, massive restructurings and a general undermining of so-called "welfare states", alongside expanded roles for the voluntary, non-profit and private sectors, also need to be considered. These restructurings often reproduce older ideas of a division between the "deserving" and the "undeserving", imposing "moralising" and "responsibilising" judgements on those who have failed to care for their own family members, and forcing public health and welfare institutions to frame difficult choices in terms of maximising efficiency and reducing costs.

Beneficiaries are meant to no longer be "passive" recipients of welfare but are expected to be "active" across many domains. Those who live longer should work longer, through increased "financial literacy" they should ensure their own material well-being in old age not rely on pay-as-you-go state pensions, and, above all, through "active ageing" should be helped to "stay in charge of their own lives for as long as possible".²⁵ The destruction of what Andrea Muehlebach terms "the welfare-state chronotrope" (Muehlebach 2012: 149), creates a new division between an "active third age" and a "passive" and dependant "fourth age", a complexly gendered crisis of state and family in which "it is no longer self-evident who cares for whom, who provides the income, how it will be distributed among the family members, and whether and how long children and elderly family members have a claim to familial resources to help and support them" (ibid.: 150–151). She traces, however, the use of factual "demographic projections" within a "politics of persuasion" which works "to naturalize a contested process and foreclose critique", akin to a kind of "biological determinism" (ibid.: 160).

In a sense, it is not the processes *per se* which differ, but the rapidity of the changes in the context of war, large-scale forced migration, and ethnicised welfare arrangements which makes survival and the reproduction of the self and the management of intimate relationships of kin a seemingly constant, never ending, struggle in Bosnia and Herzegovina today. It is also the case, of course, as Andreas Hoff reminds us, that ageing presents very different societal challenges in countries which grew affluent before they grew old compared to countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have grown old without ever being affluent (Hoff 2011).

In her study of mothers of children with disability in Bijelina, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Čarna Brković (2015) argues that "the ambiguous ground of social protection", a system which is experienced as "erratic, unpredictable and mysterious", forces mothers to be flexible, to mobilise whatever resources they can, including any possible informal contacts, just to get their children a fraction of the services they need. Much as Zemka's daughters, the mothers in Brković's ethnography invoke a seemingly lost logic of welfare as a right and a duty of the state in the face of a reiteration of a logic of welfare as limited, discretionary and largely lacking in compassion. In Zemka's daughters' case, these expectations are structured through a lens of memories of social protection under socialism, but also framed by a new

²⁵ European Commission web site: <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1062&langId=en>.

“projectisation” of care, and, crucially, what are felt to be moral obligations to the families of “fallen martyrs”.

The realities of social protection within Bosnia and Herzegovina, as part of socialist Yugoslavia, as Hromadžić’s text shows, were complex and paradoxical, although certainly, improvements in both the coverage and quality of social protection and health care were important markers of Yugoslav modernity. The system of social protection was, however, rather dualistic, in terms of urban and rural populations, and highly variegated along class lines and crucially, in terms of gender. The horrific war of the 1990s, however, tends to overshadow and distort perceptions of the 1980s when, in many parts of socialist Yugoslavia, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, poverty returned for the first time in a generation, impacting dramatically on urban households without connections to the land or without remittances from family members living and working abroad (cf. Archer, Duda and Stubbs 2015). How the health and welfare system responded to the crisis of the 1980s, especially the latter part of the 1980s when funding was also reduced, is a key part of the story which is rarely told.

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-war welfare assemblages, framed as they are by processes of “complex social and political engineering” (Lendvai and Stubbs 2009: 681), remain highly unstable, uneven and contingent. Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to be marked by the emergence of an “intermestic sphere” (Pugh 2000), a hybrid and flexible “crowded playground” (Arandarenko and Golcin 2007) of newly composed and reconstituted actors all seeking, in their different ways, to translate a colonialising and disciplinary apparatus of “reform”, “modernisation” and “development” into all manner of more or less workable schemes and projects (cf. Stubbs 2015), many of which are, themselves, time-limited and most of which are in contradiction, implicitly or explicitly, with each other. This intermestic space represents, in a sense, then, yet another kind of “semi-absence” alongside that of the family and the state, albeit with profound biopolitical power, multiplying and reconfiguring ideologies, modalities and practices of care-giving, care-taking and care-receiving which are “fraught, uncertain and provisional” (Hromadžić forthcoming 2016). Although many of these “projects” may be less obviously and directly violent than the Swiss Government’s scheme in the late 1990s of building new care institutions to house older people returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina after having being granted temporary refugee status in Switzerland, all help to create new chains of meaning, new hierarchies of power and agency, new forms of inclusion and exclusion, new regimes of blame and of virtue, and new marginalisations, subordinations and silences (Clarke 2004). They are central to the reconfiguration of what Hromadžić terms “simultaneously local, regional and transnational configurations of love, care and abandonment”.

It is the invocation of the state’s “moral debt” to the families of “fallen martyrs” (*šehidska porodica*) which illustrates most clearly the incommensurability, or the lack of fit, between structural macro-level political economies and micro-level everyday lives. For it remains the case that, even in the context of neo-liberalising disciplinaries urging that social spending be reduced, rationalised and targeted on “those who need it most”, both entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina still spend disproportionately on war veterans and their families, within a much wider set of clientelistic relations of “state capture” and “institutional particularism” in which ruling political parties act as “patronage machines” allocating jobs, cash and services, and other favours, in return for votes (cf. Ferrera 2000; Stubbs and Zrinščak 2015). What is often forgotten in a “top-down” literature on clientelism, however, is that this translation from structure to everyday life is never automatic but itself requires personalised political agency for “symbolic promises” (Iraolo and Gruneberg 2008: 3) to be realised in practice.

Lacking the networks or "*veze*" needed to turn the moral capital of a martyr's family into what might be termed welfare or care capital, Zemka's daughters are forced to rely on research on the internet, a private care home and the goodwill of a distant relative even to obtain a minimum of temporary security for their mother. Any moral claims they have, as their anger turns to ideas of suing the state, are countered by accusations that they selfishly neglected their mother until it was too late, serving to strip them of any remaining "ethical citizenship" (Muehlebach 2012: 159) they may have possessed.

Zemka's story, then, appears as the condensation of all of the "perils" and none of the "pleasures" of ageing discussed from a particular Western feminist positionality by Lynne Segal (2013) in her book "Out of Time". She charts the need for a new narrative of ageing, rejecting a deterministic narrative of bodily decline and cognitive corrosion, without lapsing into an idealistic narrative of resilience, freedom, creativity and beauty, the "successful ageing" much beloved of "lifestyle" gurus and invoked in a responsabilising discourse of "active ageing". Ageing subjects are also, as Segal reminds us, differentiated across gender, class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, ability and, perhaps above all, geography. The "semi-absence" of both the state and the family, and Zemka's embodied positionality, in a particular body, place, and time, reproduces her as a subject who "ages badly", needing care, assistance and support in which too little is provided too late, and at a cost few can afford.

It would not be appropriate to judge Hromadžić's text through a crude lens of "policy relevance". In terms of care for older people in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is hard to find more than mere glimpses of "policy otherwise", prefigurative or alternative practices which could "unsettle dominant policy conceptions (...) (and) open up meaningful spaces for contestation, resistance and positive alternatives that are not only different, but actually make a difference" (Clarke, Bainton, Lendvai and Stubbs 2015: 196). Zemka's story illustrates more clearly than most the need for a new narrative of welfare, a more humane ethics of care, based on "interdependence, mutuality, and human frailty", raising "the social, economic and political value of care" (Williams 2014: 101), rescuing "solidarity" from its embeddedness in "morals" and "markets" (Muehlebach 2012: 227–8), "making social reproduction and care central to an analysis of social change and the global crisis" (Williams 2014: 87), and suggestive of the need for multi-scalar strategies, policies and politics to overcome these crises.

R EPLY

Azra Hromadžić

I would like to begin by thanking the editors for inviting such an excellent and diverse group of discussants to respond to my article. The respondents' comments are rich, stimulating, and in a productive tension with each other. My reactions to the reviewers' evaluations are numerous, but here I focus on only three large(er) themes: "responsibility," "continuity," and "methods."

Most of the reviewers address, in one way or another, the following question that is also at the heart of my article: "who ought to care (and how)?" Not surprisingly, different reviewers responded very differently to this question and the challenges it poses – from Stubbs and Danely who recommended that I include additional "semi-absences" (International Community's, Zemka's, our own ...) and "semi-recognitions"²⁶ to the "mix of care", to Milenković who suggested a different reading/analysis of the main phenomena in this article, mainly through the lens of individual responsibility. However, focusing on Zemka's *individual* responsibility for her own care, as Milenković recommends I do, would not only lead problematically to the masking of the larger – structural, political, and economic – forces and processes as they intersect to produce Zemka's unique predicament,²⁷ but it would also set in motion what Stubbs, in his comments, is asking us *not to do*:

[R]eproduce older ideas of a division between the "deserving" and the "undeserving" [individuals], imposing "moralising" and "responsibilising" judgments on those who have failed to care for [themselves and]their own family members, and forcing public health and welfare institutions to frame difficult choices in terms of maximising efficiency and reducing costs. Beneficiaries are meant to no longer be 'passive' recipients of welfare but are expected to be "active" across many domains.

Milenković's suggestion that Zemka, as well as (most) others in the Balkan semi-periphery, take things into their own (individual) hands first of all problematically paints the Balkan populations as democratically/liberally unequipped, almost child-like, thus internalizing and reproducing Balkanist discourses.²⁸ Second, this kind of the rights-based political discourse and policy would require a creation of a difficult and potentially crooked system of classification to determine who are the individuals who were, as Milenković writes, "directly

²⁶ I very much appreciate Danely's excellent suggestion to think not only about semi-absences but also about semi-recognitions as productive of new hierarchies and coordinates of acknowledgment.

²⁷ Zemka's situation is, of course, unique, due to the particular way in which these larger forces converge to produce her predicament. These forces are not random, however, but they are historically-informed, uneven systems of regulation of life; by shedding light on Zemka's story, some of these forces and their confluences also become apparent.

²⁸ Relatedly, Milenković finishes his commentary by warning against the anthropologists tendency to contribute to "neo-collectivist anti-liberal movements for which we know, as history taught us, that they, in general, provoke fascism in our societies and can represent a Weimarian introduction to new wars, criminal redistribution of private property and destruction of public in the name of the collective". It is puzzling that Milenković focuses on the fear of "stealing/redistribution of private property and the destruction of the public in the name of collective" at the historic moment when the artifacts of the Yugoslav industries and public infrastructure in Bosnia-Herzegovina and beyond are being appropriated by the corrupt ethnonationalist politicians/businessmen through the crooked privatization processes and through, what David Harvey (2004) has called, "accumulation through dispossession."

affected by the war", and who would thus be deserving of the state's care. In the country where, as Rubić and Petrović (this issue) remind us, more than 100 000 people lost their lives and 2 700 000 out of 4 000 000 became refugees and/or internally displaced, separating those who were directly impacted by the war is a project doomed to failure that would also diminish the intersubjective nature of (war) experience. Rather than erasing the effects of physical and structural violences on people's lives in the name of individual responsibility, I suggest that we envision a more inclusive and "humane ethics of care, based on interdependence, mutuality, and human frailty" (Stubbs, this issue). This ethic of care would combine such ideals as justice, equality, and individual rights with such principles as care, trust, mutual consideration, and solidarity (Held 2006).²⁹

The second major subject that requires some explication is the issue of continuity and discontinuity between the socialist past and the postsocialist present. Some discussants critique my apparent juxtaposition of the two systems, where I ostensibly privilege the past over the present (this interpretation is especially visible in the essays by Rubić and Petrović, and Milenković).³⁰ My piece, however, highlights both *continuities* and *discontinuities* between the socialist and postsocialist experiences. Discontinuities are clear: the war-produced, abrupt destruction of the former state, life projects, and material objects does not need be repeated here.³¹ But there is at least one *major continuity* between socialism and postsocialism that is crucial for the main argument of my article: *the expectation of family* to deliver care. More specifically, in the article, I write:

The paternalistic relationships and self-projections of the Yugoslav state and its citizens, and the "structures of feeling" (Williams 1977) they enticed relied heavily on traditional approaches to family care, however. For example, conventionally, Bosnians, especially Bosnian women, took care of their elderly family members. Similar to many East European countries where the state projected an image of a caring state, in reality "the private sphere of kinship, friends and personal networks became the focus for emotionally inflicted and socially embedded care. (Read 2007: 206)

This is important to stress because it reveals, as the others suggest as well, that the socialist system of care was dualistic, uneven, gendered, and partial (Stubbs, this issue; Podgorelec, this issue), and often rhetorical (Rubić and Petrović, this issue). What interests me here (and I needed to state this more clearly in the article) is that *both* socialist and postsocialist regimes of care, regardless of their rhetoric, in practice *rely on family for care*. As it was mentioned by Rubić and Petrović, the institution of Bosnian family under socialism was complex, and it witnessed great transformations, including massive migrations from rural to urban settings (see Bringa 1995). And yet, regardless of these significant alterations, the Bosnian socialist family in general was, especially when compared to the present day situation, fairly

²⁹ My approach to the ethical dimensions of care is inspired by the work of Virginia Held (*Ethics of Care* 2006). The author invites us to understand the significance of our ties, and thus our responsibility and dependency, to our families and groups. In her book, Held assesses such ties, focusing on caring relations rather than simply on the virtues and responsibilities of individuals.

³⁰ I do believe, however, that we might have some very good reasons to be nostalgic for certain aspects of the socialist past, especially if we compare the present-day and the former standards of living, the relative position in the world, and the availability of social provisions, among others. I do agree, however, with Stubbs, Milenković, and Rubić and Petrović, that a more in-depth, archival research and analysis of the socialist period, especially the 1980s "crisis", is in place, and I will expand this research in my future work.

³¹ In response to Rubić and Petrović's comments that people did not "overnight" start living according to the new model, I would just add that to many Bosnian-Herzegovinian people, their lives did, to a large extent "change abruptly, overnight" and that many of them whom I interviewed, could tell the exact date when their lives changed suddenly (i.e., the night of the forceful expulsion from their hometowns; the day when their classmates of "other ethnic group" did not come to school; or the night when the siege began). It was in those moments that the life as they knew it ceased to exist, and a new model of living, be it refugee, internal displacement, or life under siege, began. In addition, while the war was unfolding, the process of privatization of public and state property, thus a new model, started to unfold. This process of crooked privatization was, however, overshadowed and distorted by the war.

financially and socially secure and rather geographically compact.³² Today, however, when the official unemployment rate hovers around 27% (63% among youth),³³ families are *materially incapacitated* and commonly cannot afford to take care of their elderly members in need (a point that Podgorelec also underscores in her essay). What is more, since family members are frequently unemployed, they often live off the pensions of their elderly family members. In addition to these material challenges, and due to the burden of the war-produced exile, numerous families were also fragmented by the war and thus *physically absent*, adding yet another pressure to the already fragile and family-dependent eldercare.³⁴ In conclusion, the “crisis of care” is found in most of the European countries for reasons that Stubbs finely explains in his essay; however, the challenges of this crisis are especially visible and felt in Bosnia-Herzegovina which has “grown old without ever being affluent” (Hoff 2011 cited in Stubbs, this issue) and where the postwar and postsocialist transformations converge especially powerfully and vividly.

Finally, the methods: Some reviewers critique my reliance on one story (Zemka’s) and my “lack of reflexivity” in the article. I am in agreement with Rubić and Petrović when they suggest that relying on an individual story can be a “risky business” because one can easily slip into an anecdotal account (also see Milenković, this issue). I also agree with them that to be anthropologically productive, a story has to be placed in its larger context – a task I attempted to accomplish with the discussion of how the war and (post)socialist events converge to produce Zemka’s unique predicament.³⁵

It is the comment about reflexivity, and emic and etic positionality, which interest me greatly. I am, of course, aware of the importance of reflexivity in ethnographic and anthropological writing, and I see it as ethically important and analytically productive (when it does not replace ethnographic data with self-reflection, of course).³⁶ I am not sure, however, that reflexivity would necessarily enrich this particular piece. Rather, the inclusion of my personal background in this short piece would direct attention away from Zemka to my own story in ways that are neither productive nor desired, but could divert attention away from the ethics of care and appear as self-centered: To be effective, reflexive interventions need to illuminate or explain something about the field, the encounters in the field, and the interpretations of those encounters. After carefully reading Rubić and Petrović’s comments, however, I still wonder which precise aspects of my analysis or ethnographic encounters suffer due to my “failure” to position myself – via coordinates of nationalism/ethnicity, class and gender – in the text? What is it, according to the authors, that I could not “see” due to my perceived

³² The situation was better, of course, during the early decades of the socialist rule; the unemployment levels steadily increased in the socialist Yugoslavia from 6.6 % in 1965 to 16.1% in 1987 prompting an outmigration of work-age males (see Woodward 1995, pp. 199, 378). The majority these people, worked in Austria, Germany, and other European countries as manual laborers and construction workers, and they regularly returned to their homes and families for weekend visits and holidays.

³³ According to the Bosnian Agency for Statistics, the official unemployment rate, calculated on the basis of ILO methodology is 27% (see: http://www.bhas.ba/?option=com_publicacija&id=1&lang=ba). However, some sources report that the nominal rate of unemployment may be as high as 44% (see: <http://www.business.hr/ekonomija/stvarna-nezaposlenost-u-bih-27-posto-nominalna-cak-44-posto>).

³⁴ The gendered nature of (elder) care and the additional burden it puts on women was not covered in this article, but it is the main subject of another article I am currently writing. What is important to emphasize here is that the socialist, work-related migrations were usually male-dominated, meaning that women commonly stayed in Bosnia where they continued to provide – in addition to home-making and child-rearing – eldercare. The war-produced exile, however, displaced both men and women, and it ruptured families in ways that often prevented women from providing eldercare.

³⁵ I do agree with the authors (Rubić and Petrović, and Milenković), however, that this aspect of my article could have been better supported with archival research and the inclusion of small, but relevant literature. Since this fieldwork is in its embryotic state, I hope to improve and expand these domains of research and analysis in the future.

³⁶ For example, in my book *Citizens of an Empty Nation* I reflect painstakingly on my positionality within the field in order to explain the texture of my encounters, evaluations, and interpretations.

proximity to the field?³⁷ The answers to these questions are important; otherwise, reflexivity would (problematically) become a goal in itself.

In conclusion, I agree that we cannot generalize about Bosnia-Herzegovina or, even worse, the Balkans, from one, in this case, Zemka's experience – my intervention never intended to suggest that. I would personally not use the romanticizing and exotic discourse of "one ornament on a Bosnian carpet" to talk about Zemka's experience in relation to the larger "field," however. Rather, I understand her particular assemblage of care, abandonment, and pathology to emerge from an amalgamation of her unique personal circumstance and historically-informed, complex networks of family, medicine, state, and economy.

³⁷ Relatedly, I am also uncomfortable with the emic and etic distinction – archaic concepts in anthropology, which crudely divide the world between (mostly nationally and 'racially' conceptualized) insiders and outsiders. Is not all ethnographic fieldwork a continuous negotiation and maneuvering of multiple lines of inclusion and exclusion which blur distinctions and are never uniform and singular, and which challenge the emic/etic dichotomy and types of knowledge ("etic/objective" vs. "emic/subjective") that they allegedly produce?

‘ ‘ A GDJE SU ONI BILI DOSAD?’’

Starenje, skrb i napuštanje u jednom bosanskom gradu

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Članak je smješten u Bosnu i Hercegovinu, točnije u grad Bihać, i etnografski propituje promjene u shvaćanju koncepata države i obitelji na primjeru praksi brige o starijim osobama. Koristeći etnografske podatke prikupljene tijekom istraživanja u domu za starije osobe “Vitalis” u Bihaću, te životnu sudbinu starije Bosanke koju ovdje zovem Zemka, u ovom članku tvrdim da se država i obitelj u poslijeratnoj i postsocijalističkoj Bosni i Hercegovini materijaliziraju kao polu-odsutne. Kroz proces razotkrivanja tih mnogostrukih polu-odsutnosti, raskrinkavam i načine na koje posljedice transformacije poslijeratne i postsocijalističke države te obiteljskih odnosa utječu na živote “običnih” ljudi.

Ključne riječi: briga, starenje, država, obitelj, polu-odsutnost, socijalizam i postsocijalizam, rat i poslijeratno stanje

“Krizna skrbi” (Phillips i Benner 1995), posebice skrbi za starije osobe, u posljednje se vrijeme javlja kao česta tema u antropologiji, sociologiji, gerontologiji i drugim akademskim disciplinama, kao i u politici. Mnoge studije ukazuju na različite aspekte “krize”, uključujući i socio-ekonomski, koji je posljedica produljenja očekivanog trajanja života u privilegiranim dijelovima svijeta; ukazuju i na smanjenje državne socijalne i zdravstvene skrbi te na nove oblike obiteljskih odnosa koji nisu u skladu s tradicijskim očekivanjima o pružanju skrbi u različitim socio-kulturnim kontekstima (vidjeti Ujedinjeni Narodi 2002).

U ovom članku bavim se Balkanom, točnije Bosnom i Hercegovinom, kako bih prikazala učinke koje te promjenjive topografije i modalnosti skrbi imaju na živote “običnih” ljudi.¹ Tvrdim da su baš na Balkanu tjeskobe oko “poteškoća starenja” i promjenjive uloge obitelji i države u pružanju skrbi za starije posebno vidljive te dodatno pojačane postsocijalističkim (od 1989. do danas) i poslijeratnim (od 1995. do danas) transformacijama (vidjeti Havelka 2003).

Taj aspekt društvene transformacije promakao je većini znanstvenika s ovoga područja.² Većina antropoloških i srodnih istraživanja Balkana i posebice Bosne i Hercegovine, uključujući i moja vlastita, analiziraju ovaj prostor prvenstveno kroz prizmu etniciteta, nacionalizma i poslijeratne rekonstrukcije (vidjeti, među ostalima, Bieber 2005; Brown 2006; Chandler 1999; Campbell 1999; Coles 2007; Fassin i Pandolfi 2010; Hayden 1996; Hromadžić 2015; Jansen 2005; Kurtović 2011; Sorabji 1995; Veredery 1994; Woodward 1995). Problemi “običnih ljudi” ukazuju, međutim, na mnoge druge aspekte koji snažno i kompleksno oblikuju živote, a ipak ostaju nevidljivi ili marginalizirani u većini istraživanja koja se usredotočuju

¹ Termin “obični ljudi” koristim s posebnim oprezom. Kao što je naglasila Veena Das (2007), “svakodnevno” je mjesto na kojem se politika odvija na dubokoj razini.

² Ta “omaška” je usko vezana uz načine na koje se ono što se smatra (pouzdanim) znanjem (u ovom slučaju znanjem o Balkanu) zapravo proizvodi uz distribuciju istraživačkih potpora i stipendija.

na (etno)nacionalizam (iznimka su, među ostalima, primjerice Stubbs 2002; Stubbs i Maglajić 2012; Završček i Leskošek 2005).³

U tekstu koji slijedi pokušat ću rasvijetliti neke od domena svakodnevnice koje su zanemarene u istraživanjima, ali koje bitno određuju životne sudbine, usredotočujući se na suprotstavljena očekivanja i ideologije povezane s konceptima skrbi i odgovornosti na načine na koje se oni ostvaruju u životima običnih Bosanaca. S tim ciljem fokusirat ću se na životnu sudbinu starije žene koju ovdje zovem Zemka,⁴ i čija borba sa skrbi, odgovornosti i zanemarivanjem jasno ukazuje kako se država, dom i egzil (Lamb 2009), napuštanje (Biehl 2005; Bourgois 2009) i društvena marginalizacija (Gilleard i Higgs 2011) promišljaju, žive i zamišljaju.

Ovim pristupom Zemkinoj priči suprotstavljam se, dakle, "gerontoantropološkoj amneziji" (Cohen 1994: 151), koja nastoji romantizirati, ukalupiti, dehistorizirati i depolitizirati stariju životnu dob. Naime, smještam ovaj etnografski susret u sferu "političkog" u antropološkom, dakle, širokom i kontekstualiziranom smislu te riječi. Snažan sadržaj priče koristim kako bih objasnila povijesno uvjetovane oblike skrbi koji se pojavljuju, preklapaju i preoblikuju iz ruševina rata i socijalizma. Nadalje, koristim etnografiju kao hermeneutički alat kojim ću obuhvatiti i razjasniti učinke transformirane poslijeratne i postsocijalističke države i novih obiteljskih odnosa na živote običnih ljudi. Zemkina je priča stoga priča o izmještenom starenju; suptilno se dotičući njenih fenomenoloških (iskustvenih i utjelovljenih), racionalnih/političkih (hegemonijskih, ideoloških i rodnih) i hermeneutičkih aspekata (Cohen 1994: 151), u članku ustvrđujem da se i država i obitelj u poslijeratnoj i postsocijalističkoj Bosni i Hercegovini pojavljuju kao polu-odsutne: država je birokratski i politički sveprisutna, ali u biopolitičkom smislu sve više nestaje, dok je obitelj materijalno prisutna, ali je fizički negdje drugdje. Unutar tih okvira nejednakih i mnogostrukih, politički i društveno stvorenih polu-odsustava možemo postupno razumijevati područje starenja i skrbi kao temeljnu dimenziju političkih i društvenih praksi u Bosni gdje "su životi, po navici, ugroženi" (Jašarević 2011: 109).

"Idem u Ameriku, da živim sa svojim sinom"

Početak je lipnja 2013. godine i u Bihacu, bosanskom gradiću⁵ smještenom na sjeverozapadu uz granicu s Hrvatskom, topao je dan. Zajedno s nekolicinom štićenika, sjedim u sjeni velikog suncobrana ispred "Vitalisa" – privatnog doma za starije osobe, koji je otvoren prije

³ Time, naravno, ne želim reći da etnonacionalizam nije važan ljudima na Balkanu. Međutim, on je samo jedan od brojnih pokretača – uključujući siromaštvo, nezaposlenost i korupciju – koji zajednički oblikuju živote običnih ljudi.

⁴ Sva su osobna imena promijenjena radi zaštite privatnosti osoba uključenih u istraživanje.

⁵ Područje oko Bihaca, poznato i pod imenom Krajina, u kojem živi oko 300 000 uglavnom Bošnjaka, najsjeverozapadniji je dio zemlje i "zaboravljeno bosansko ratište" (O'Shea 2012). Taj je kraj pretrpio strašna razaranja tijekom rata 1990-ih. Najveći grad je Bihac, koji je šesti grad po veličini u Bosni i Hercegovini i u kojem živi oko 50 000 stanovnika. Područje je bilo pod opsadom više od tri godine, ali ga srpska vojska nikada nije osvojila. Na početku rata srpsko je stanovništvo Bihaca napustilo grad i iselilo se u druga većinski srpska područja u zemlji ili u inozemstvo. Rat je započeo u lipnju 1992. godine kada je srpska vojska okupirala grad i započela snažno granatiranje. Bošnjačka (oko 66% stanovništva) i hrvatska (otprilike 8% stanovništva) vojska i civili zajednički su branili grad tijekom trogodišnje opsade. Nadalje, 1993. je godine sjeverni dio područja pod opsadom, a kojega je vodio biznismen koji je postao političar, Fikret Abdić, proglasio nezavisnost od bosanske vlade i njene vojske te počeo surađivati sa srpskim snagama. To je dodatno otežalo situaciju na bihačkom području, koje je oslobođeno u kontroverznoj ofenzivi bošnjačko-hrvatske vojske, ubrzo nakon koje je potpisan mirovni sporazum u Daytonu. Sporazum je donio mir Bosni i Hercegovini i podijelio zemlju na bošnjačko-hrvatsku Federaciju (51% teritorija) i Republiku Srpsku (49% teritorija). Svi entiteti imaju karakteristike države unutar veće, kompleksnije države. Federacija Bosna i Hercegovina je podijeljena na deset kantona, a Bihac je administrativno središte i najveći grad Unsko-sanskog kantona.

dvije godine i ima kapacitet od dvadeset kreveta. Automobil, čiju marku i boju ne uspijevam razaznati na jarkom podnevnom suncu, parkira na prilaznom putu "Vitalisa". Lidija, vlasnica doma, naglo ustaje i žuri do ograde kako bi poželjela dobrodošlicu novoj štićenici doma, Zemki. Promatram kako sredovječni muškarac izlazi s vozačkog mjesta i otvara stražnja vrata. Muškarac podiže Zemku sa stražnjeg sjedišta i nježno je smješta u invalidska kolica – mi "parkiramo" Zemku uz susjedni, veliki stol. Nekoliko ostalih štićenika promatraju pridošlicu sa znatiželjom. Muškarac koji je doveo Zemku izvaljuje se u jedan od stolaca, obilno se znojeći. Nestrpljivo briše lice. Bacim pogled prema Zemki – ruke su joj tamnoljubičaste, gotovo crne. Primjećujem da su joj ispod bolničke spavačice, na kojoj se na nekoliko mjesta vide velike mrlje osušene krvi, stopala jednako crna i natečena.

Čovjek, čije ime je Sead, počinje mi pričati dramatičnu priču o Zemkinom dolasku u "Vitalis": Zemka je toga dana bila otpuštena iz bihačke Kantonalne bolnice. Dva dana ranije bolnica je nazvala Zemkine tri kćeri, koje žive u Njemačkoj, i objasnila im da članovi obitelji moraju doći po majku do 14 sati poslijepodne sljedećega dana – bolnica je učinila sve što je mogla i sada je bio red na obitelji da preuzme odgovornost i brigu o njoj. Tri kćeri – Ekrema, Selma i Adila – udaljene tisućama kilometara i zauzete svojim poslovima i vlastitim nuklearnim obiteljima uspaničile su se, znajući da neće moći stići u Bihać na vrijeme da bi preuzele brigu o bolesnoj majci. U panici su pretraživale internet u potrazi za nekom institucijom kojoj bi se mogle obratiti; tako su i otkrile Lidijin privatni dom. Istodobno su kontaktirale najbližeg rođaka, Seada, koji živi na udaljenosti od dva i pol sata od Bihaća, blizu Jajca, gradića u središnjoj Bosni. Rekao im je da će im rado pomoći, ali da ne može stići do dva sata popodne sljedećega dana.

Lidiju je dirnula sudbina te obitelji koja je, kako je uskoro saznala, jako patila tijekom i nakon rata. Željela je pomoći, ali nije imala slobodnih kreveta. Stoga je nazvala bolnicu i zamolila ih da zadrže Zemku još jedan dan dok ona sve pripremi za njezin dolazak. Glavna sestra je, prema Lidijinim riječima, oštro odvrtila: "Ne, mi to ne možemo učiniti. Mi na njima ne zarađujemo", aludirajući pritom na to da Lidija zarađuje na tuđoj mucu. Lidiju je toliko pogodio taj komentar da je zaprijetila da će pozvati policiju i reći im da državna bolnica izbacuje na ulicu osamdesetogodišnju izbjeglicu. Nakon Lidijine prijete sestra se smilovala i rekla da će bolnica zadržati Zemku pod svojim krovom još jedan dan.

Dok je Lidija pričala svoju priču, Zemka me pogledala sa smiješkom i rekla: "Idem u Ameriku [Sjedinjene Države], da živim sa svojim sinom." Sead je tužno odmahnuo glavom i šapnuo mi: "Dementna je. Sin joj je ubijen tijekom rata, u Srebrenici." Sead je popio svoje piće, ustao, zagrlio svoju sitnu tetu u krvlju umrljanoj bolničkoj spavačici, te krenuo za Jajce. Uskoro i sama odlazim, duboko potresena. Pet dana poslije, na putu za "Vitalis", ugledam Zemkinu osmrtnicu; njena dženaza (islamski pogrebni ritual), kako je navedeno na osmrtnici, održat će se sljedećega dana. U dom stižem rano poslijepodne i nalazim Zemkine kćeri kako sjede ispred doma i razgovaraju s Lidijom i ostalim štićenicima. Stigle su na ukop svoje majke i sada su tužne i bijesne. Žale se na državu u kojoj "nema ni reda ni sistema", gdje bolnice mogu izbacivati stare i bolesne na ulicu i gdje jedna "šehidska familija" može doživjeti nešto takvo. Tužit će bolnicu! One žive u Njemačkoj i tamo se takvo što nikada ne bi dogodilo! Lidija, koja je također svoje izbjegličke godine provela u Njemačkoj, potvrdno klima glavom. Nježno pokušava utješiti obitelj. Sestre naposljetku odlaze. Dok promatramo njihov automobil koji odlazi, Lidija mi šapne: "Ne mogu one njih tužiti. Znaš li da je Zemka u bolnicu stigla u groznom stanju? Bila je potpuno zapuštena. Pa, mislim, a gdje su oni [obitelj] bili dosad?"

Zemkina priča je iznimno bremenita – ona uokviruje, otkriva i zapliće mnogostruke afektivne povezanosti i praktične odnose ljubavi, skrbi i napuštanja kako se oni nanovo oblikuju

u poslijeratnom kontekstu, na kraju socijalizma. Zemka je “propala” kroz pukotine u sustavu, naposljetku i umrla, uhvaćena u mrežu tih promjenjivih topografija skrbi i zanemarivanja. Kako bih dosljedno analizirala Zemkinu priču, smještam je u kontekst poslijeratnog i postsocijalističkog razdoblja. Iako su poslijeratni i postsocijalistički kontekst nerazmrsivo prepleteni u životima ljudi, zbog analitičke jasnoće smještam ih u dva odvojena poglavlja. Prvo se bavim razmjerima poslijeratnog iskustva.

(Poslije)ratni sklopovi: *šehidi*, život i smrt

Zemkina obitelj bila je u epicentru jugoslavenskih ratova tijekom devedesetih. Rat na bosanskom teritoriju zatekao je Zemku u već poznijem dobu, kada je imala šezdesetak godina, u gradiću Šipovu u kojem je provela većinu života. Šipovo je bilo miješani grad – većina stanovnika bili su Srbi (oko 80%), sa značajnim postotkom Bošnjaka (oko 18%) i nešto ostalih (prvenstveno Hrvata i Jugoslavena). Takav “miješani” sastav stanovništva, u kojem različite etničke skupine stoljećima koegzistiraju, bio je tipičan za Bosnu i Hercegovinu i za socijalističku Jugoslaviju općenito.⁶

Zemkina je obitelj jedna od onih koje su bile prisiljene napustiti svoj dom već na samom početku ratnih sukoba.⁷ Na početku rata Zemkin jedini sin, Edin, služio je obvezni vojni rok u Jugoslavenskoj narodnoj armiji (JNA) i bio je poslan na bojište u istočnu Bosnu gdje je pobjegao iz redova JNA i pridružio se Armiji Bosne i Hercegovine. Nekoliko godina nakon toga, Edina su ubile srpske paravojne snage u Srebrenici, zloglasnom mjestu genocida nad Bošnjacima. Vijest o tom strašnom gubitku Zemkinu obitelj već je zatekla osakaćenu ratom: Zemkine kćeri, nakon nekoliko godina izbjegličkog života i nagovarane od strane svojih roditelja da napuste ratom opustošenu Bosnu, emigrirale su u Njemačku, zajedno sa stotinama tisuća izbjeglica iz Bosne i Hercegovine. Zemkin suprug preminuo je tijekom njihovog izbjeglištva. Zemka, koja je ostala sama, a čija je kuća sada bila dio teritorija i struktura “Republike Srpske”, našla se u Bijelom Brdu,⁸ miješanom srpsko-muslimanskom gradiću u blizini Bihaća, daleko od svojih kćeri i od članova šire obitelji, koji su bili raštrkani od Šipova do raznih dijelova svijeta. U Bijelom Brdu svakodnevno ju je posjećivala medicinska sestra u mirovini, Srpkinja, koja je redovito mijenjala Zemkine zavoje. Iako nitko u “Vitalistu” ne zna točno kako se Zemka našla u tom dijelu Bosne i Hercegovine, posljednje godine njena života jasno ukazuju na trenutačne kontradikcije vezane uz poslijeratnu državu, obitelj i skrb, o čemu snažno svjedoče Lidijine riječi: “Koja ironija – da te kao izbjeglicu istjeraju Srbi, da ti ubiju sina, a onda da ostaneš sama, u nepoznatom gradu, dok o tebi brine Srpkinja. Nitko ne zna što ga čeka.” Budući da joj se zdravlje rapidno pogoršavalo, Zemku su naposljetku smjestili u najveću regionalnu bolnicu u Bihaću. Dok joj je tijelo polako gubilo bitku, njene su se kćeri našle

⁶ Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija bila je federacija šest republika: Slovenije, Hrvatske, Bosne i Hercegovine, Srbije (s dvije autonomne pokrajine, Kosovom i Vojvodinom), Crne Gore i Makedonije. Nastala je nakon Drugog svjetskog rata pod vodstvom karizmatičnog komunističkog vođe Josipa Broza Tita i njegove ideologije bratstva i jedinstva – službene politike međuetničkih odnosa prema kojoj su svi jugoslavenski narodi i narodnosti trebali koegzistirati u miru i njegovati ideje miješanih brakova i međusobne povezanosti.

⁷ Bosna i Hercegovina postala je nezavisna 6. travnja 1992. Na dan priznanja Bosne i Hercegovine srpske paramilitarne jedinice i Jugoslavenska narodna armija (JNA) napale su bosanski glavni grad Sarajevo te započele rat u Bosni i Hercegovini. Vojska samoproglašene Srpske Republike Bosne i Hercegovine (Republike Srpske) unutar teritorija Bosne i Hercegovine, uz pomoć ljudstva i oružja iz Srbije, uspješno je izvršila etničko čišćenje i nasilno razdvojila usko povezane zajednice i živote (Hayden 1996) te okupirala gotovo 70% teritorija do kraja 1993. godine. Počinila je i neke od najgorih zločina nad ne-srpskim stanovništvom, uključujući i Zemkinu obitelj.

⁸ Bijelo Brdo je pseudonim.

u situaciji tipičnoj za mnoge Bosance i Hercegovce koji žive kao ratna dijaspora i koji traže rješenje za svoj transnacionalni problem – skrbi o svojim ostarjelim roditeljima i ostalim članovima obitelji na daljinu. Ti su procesi otkrili “kolektivni skandal”⁹ i jednu ranjivu zonu kulturne intimnosti (Herzfeld 2005): sve veću nemogućnost države i obitelji u suvremenoj Bosni i Hercegovini da skrbe o svojim starijim sunarodnjacima.

Postsocijalističke stvarnosti: polu-odsutnost države i obitelji¹⁰

Već je tijekom 1950-ih godina socijalistička Jugoslavija razvila bogatu decentraliziranu mrežu republičkih institucija koje su se bavile pružanjem socijalne skrbi (Zaviršek i Leskošek 2005: 39). Infrastruktura jugoslavenske socijalne službe bila je dobro razvijena i ostvarena kroz široku mrežu lokalnih Centara za socijalnu skrb kao i putem “uobičajenih smještajnih ustanova za dugoročni boravak djece i odraslih” (Stubbs i Maglajlić 2007: 1177). Iako su parametri socijalne zaštite bili ponešto drugačiji u pojedinim jugoslavenskim republikama, u svima je sustav socijalne skrbi uključivao neke elemente socijalističkog samoupravljanja, *bizmarkijanizma*, te uključivanja određenog broja ne-državnih čimbenika, kao što su vjerske institucije (Stubbs i Maglajlić 2007: 1176).

Kao posljedica takvih odrednica “socijalističkog humanizma” (vidjeti, između ostalih, Cohen i Marković 1975; Horvat 1982), jugoslavenska država, odnosno socijalistička država općenito, shvaćana je kao očinska (Manning 2007), odnosno zamišljena kao “brižan roditelj koji skrbi o svojim građanima-djeci” (Dunn 2008: 247; vidjeti također Verdery 1996). Ta ideja o brižnoj državi stvorila je očekivanja o tome što bi država zapravo trebala osigurati (Dunn 2008): najveća dužnost države kao “velikog oca” (Zaviršek i Leskošek 2005: 40) bila je da se “pobrine za društvo kao cjelinu” u procesu koji će, prema socijalističkoj ideologiji, u konačnici dovesti do prestanka bilo kakve potrebe za socijalnom pomoći općenito, jer će svi biti zbrinuti.¹¹ Kako bi to postigla, jugoslavenska je država putem obuhvatnih regulacijskih tehnologija počela prikupljati informacije i upustila se u kontrolu bioloških uvjetovanosti stanovništva. Kao rezultat toga, “vlada je postala odgovorna za životne uvjete ljudi od kolijevke pa do groba” (Zaviršek i Leskošek 2005: 46). U suglasju s ostalim politikama skrbi o građanstvu, socijalistički zdravstveni sustav pružao je univerzalnu medicinsku skrb i definiran je kao “racionalan, progresivan i znanstven” (Read 2007: 204). Ta “univerzalna” prava na socijalnu skrb i zdravstveni sustav bila su ključna za ideju socijalističke modernosti i način na koji je socijalistička država demonstrirala svoju brigu za građane (Read 2007: 203). Odgovor Jugoslavena na te novine socijalizma bila je kombinacija “entuzijazma i nade, pomiješanih sa strahom i nepovjerenjem” (Zaviršek i Leskošek 2005: 46).

Dok je država uspostavila kontrolu i upravljanje nad gotovo svim aspektima skrbi o građanima, u slučaju skrbi za starije država je čvrsto nastojala izbjeći stvaranje izdvojenih (medicinskih) ustanova koje bi se isključivo bavile skrbi za starije (Sokolovsky et al. 1991: 322). Naprotiv, decentralizirani socijalistički sustav usredotočio se na stvaranje obuhvatnih sustava primarne zaštite i zdravstvenih centara koji su bili povezani s lokalnim “samoupravljajčkim

⁹ Larisi Jašarević zahvaljujem na ovom terminu.

¹⁰ Dijelovi ovoga odlomka pojavljuju se i u A. Hromadžić, u tisku 2016. “Affective labor: work, love, and care for the elderly in Bihać” u Brković, Č., V. Čelebić i S. Jansen, ur. *Negotiating Social Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Farnham: Ashgate.

¹¹ Naravno, nisu baš “svi” jednako zaslužili zaštitu i pomoć države. Zaviršek i Leskošek (2005: 47–49) objašnjavaju kako je vlada podijelila ljude na one koji “zaslužuju” i one koji “ne zaslužuju” ili na “naše” i “ne-naše”, pri čemu su potonji većinom bili bivši vlasnici dućana, tvornica i banaka te poneki preživjeli Židovi, kojima je nova socijalistička vlada oduzela imovinu.

interesnim zajednicama (...), a koji su potekli iz domova narodnog zdravlja" (Sokolovsky et al. 1991: 322). Nadalje, različite republike unutar Jugoslavije imale su sasvim različite raspodjele domova za starije: 1987. godine Hrvatska je bila prva po broju (120) smještajnih ustanova za starije (domova umirovljenika), dok su u Beogradu, glavnom gradu Srbije i bivše Jugoslavije, postojala samo dva takva doma (Sokolovsky et al. 1991: 321). Ti nerazmjeri posljedica su različitih povijesnih i infrastrukturnih čimbenika te recentnijih demografskih kretanja: primjerice, u Hrvatskoj je infrastruktura skrbi za starije bila mnogo razvijenija dok je Srbija osnovala najveći broj ustanova za djecu bez roditeljske skrbi.¹² Također, u ruralnim područjima Hrvatske bio je snažno prisutan trend iseljavanja mladog stanovništva, koje se stoga nije moglo brinuti za svoje ostarjele roditelje (Sokolovsky et al. 1991: 321), što opet ukazuje na snažnu socio-kulturnu vezu između države, obitelji i skrbi za starije osobe.

Paternalistički odnos i samo-projeksije jugoslavenske države i njenih građana te "strukture emocija" (Williams 1977) koje su oni izazivali bili su, međutim, duboko utemeljeni na tradicijskim oblicima obiteljske skrbi. Primjerice, Bosanci, posebice Bosanke, tradicionalno su skrбиле o starijim članovima obitelji. Slično kao i u mnogim istočnoeuropskim zemljama u kojima je država odavala dojam brižne države, u stvarnosti su "privatna domena srodstva, prijateljstva i osobnih veza postala temeljem za emocionalno uvjetovanu i društveno utemeljenu skrb" (Read 2007: 206). Sve donedavno o starijim su Bosancima fizički i emocionalno skrabila njihova djeca i često se pretpostavljalo da će starci živjeti s barem jednim od svoje djece, najčešće s najmlađim sinom i njegovom obitelji. Ta očekivanja temeljila su se na kulturnim stavovima koji su naglašavali prirodu zajedništva srodničkih i simbiotskih veza među generacijama (Simić 1990: 97). Pravni je sustav također usvojio ta kulturna očekivanja: primjerice, članak 150 Ustava bivše Jugoslavije definirao je da je skrb za starije odgovornost njihove djece (Tomorad i Galožuša 1984: 306), a članak 190/10 navodi: "Članovi obitelji imaju prava i odgovornosti da uzdržavaju svoje roditelje (...) i da roditelji uzdržavaju njih, kao izraz obiteljske solidarnosti" (vidjeti Sokolovsky et al. 1991: 321). Ta zakonska prava i institucionalizirane opcije obiteljske skrbi nisu, međutim, uvijek bili dosljedno provođeni,¹³ ali su svakako oblikovali svakodnevne diskurse o odgovornosti i skrbi, koji se jasno iščitavaju u Lidijinom komentaru: "A gdje su oni bili dosad?", implicirajući da Zemkine kćeri nisu trebale očekivati da država odradi "njihov posao" – skrbi o njihovoj bolesnoj majci. Zbog ratom uzrokovanog izbjeglištva, mnoge obitelji nisu mogle ispuniti ta očekivanja o "skrbi iz blizine", što je rezultiralo velikim pomacima u poslijeratnim i postsocijalističkim shvaćanjima skrbi te, usput, otkrilo mnoge nelogičnosti, ideologije i mitove vezane uz pružanje skrbi, prošle i sadašnje.

Budući da je poslijeratna država razlomljena, a obitelji razjedinjene, "kriza skrbi" je u Bosni i Hercegovini postala sveopća te je razotkrila suprotstavljene ideologije i očekivanja vezana uz skrb: s jedne strane, (socijalistička) država je projicirala ideju da ona sama pruža potrebnu skrb, a pritom se oslanjala na obitelji koje su morale brinuti o svojim starijim članovima, dok su, s druge strane, obitelji bile te koje su pružale većinu skrbi, ali su i dalje usvajale ideologiju paternalističke države. U poslijeratnom razdoblju ta su suprotstavljena očekivanja i nemogućnost da se ispune vlastite, stvarne i zamišljene, uloge otkrili nedosljednosti u samoj ideologiji odgovornosti i imali za posljedicu mnoge afektivne reakcije i optužbe za neuspjeh. Obitelj je, baš kao i država, stoga iz rata izašla kao polu-odsutna; materijalno

¹² Paul Stubbs, osobni razgovor, 17. listopada 2014. godine.

¹³ Tomorad i Galožuša tvrde da bez obzira na to što starije osobe imaju zakonsko pravo da o njima skrbe njihovi potomci, oni se vrlo rijetko koriste zakonom kako bi osigurali ta prava, jer su svjesni da u takvom odnosu nedostaje emocionalni temelj. Autori također tvrde da potomci ponekad i nisu u financijskoj mogućnosti da uzdržavaju svoje roditelje (1984: 306, n1).

prisutna (plaćali su znatne troškove privatnog doma za starije)¹⁴ i fizički potpuno odsutna (u nemogućnosti da iz blizine pruži ljubav i skrb). Pa ipak, bez obzira na sve veću isključenost poslijeratne države iz biopolitike – poslijeratna država je ujedno birokratski sveprisutna i biopolitički odsutna (ili sve više isključena) iz skrbi o građanima – Zemkine su kćeri svejedno očekivale da će država pomoći barem *njima*, jer su oni “šehidska porodica”. Drugim riječima, poslijeratna Bosna i Hercegovina je, prema njihovim očekivanjima, imala “moralnu obvezu” (Han 2012: 4) prema Zemkinjoj obitelji, jer je obitelj državi dala najveću moguću žrtvu, u krvi, kako bi osigurala njenu opstojnost tijekom rata. Kada ta moralna obveza nije ispoštovana, nego je potpuno zanemarena od strane države – u ovom slučaju Kantonalne bolnice u Bihaću – kćeri su osjećale izdaju, nepravdu i, konačno, srdžbu. Ta suprotstavljena očekivanja o skrbi i reciprocitetu između poslijeratne države i njenih najzaslužnijih građana – obitelji *šehida* – stvorila su stoga veliku prazninu ispunjenu snažnim osjećajima razočaranja građana u dijaspori i Zemkinim napuštenim, ispaćenim, starim tijelom. Topografiju Zemkinog tijela – napaćenog, u modricama, umrljanog krvlju i natečenog – tumačim stoga kao utjelovljeni simbol polu-odsutnosti države i obitelji i njihovog snažnog urušavanja u tijelo stare žene u suvremenoj Bosni. Zemkino je iskustvo snažna refleksija tih polu-odsutnosti koje su duboko utjelovljene, bolno opipljive i koje upućuju na promjenjive i diferencijalne “pedagogije pažnje” (Cohen 2008: 337).

Zaključak

Zemkina potresna priča o životu i smrti na Balkanu ukazuje na učinke polu-odsutne države i polu-odsutne obitelji na starije stanovništvo u zemlji. Iskustva te obitelji svakako su jedinstvena u svojim intimnim borbama, patnjama i ranama, a, opet, po mnogo čemu slična brojnim drugima. To je priča o ratnom izgnanstvu i razaranju života, tijela i objekata; o slabljenju, polu-odsutnosti i reformaciji poslijeratne i postsocijalističke države; o obiteljima koje razdvajaju kontinenti; o novim domovima i granicama i o promjenjivim domenama i očekivanjima od života i smrti, skrbi i odgovornosti.

Većina ljudi koje sam srela u Bosni i Hercegovini dijele neka iskustva i emocije koje su otkrivene u Zemkinjoj priči: često se žale na loše zdravlje, na sve slabije zdravstveno stanje svoje obitelji i prijatelja, na prerane smrti mnogih prijatelja i poznanika, na urušavanje zdravstvenih sustava i sužavanje sustava socijalne skrbi i na sve veći teret društvenih, moralnih i ekonomskih dugova koji proizlaze iz tih promjena. Ti procesi, iskustva i priče oblikuju živote i smrti ljudi na Balkanu, ali ukazuju i na potrebu da se zajedno raspravlja o onome što je znanost na ovom području promatrala odvojeno: poslijeratni i postsocijalistički režimi skrbi o građanstvu; neuspjele odgovornosti i očekivanja koja stvaraju novonastale privatizirane prostore diferencijalne skrbi. Upravo te neujednačene, istodobno lokalne, regionalne i transnacionalne konfiguracije ljubavi, skrbi i napuštanja stvaraju jedinstvena, individualna i naoko suprotstavljena, a opet intimno isprepletena iskustva prošlosti i budućnosti, prisustva i odsustva, politike i emocija, te nade i izdaje u suvremenoj Bosni i izvan nje.

¹⁴ Privatna skrb za starije osobe iznimno je skupa s obzirom na životni standard u Bosni. Mjesečna cijena je između 750 i 1050 bosanskih konvertibilnih maraka (KM), što iznosi oko 380-535 € - iznos koji je svakako previsok za većinu starije populacije Bosne, koja prima prosječnu mirovinu od oko 350-400 KM (178-204 €). Članovi obitelji koji rade na raznim stranama svijeta mogu samo povremeno posjećivati svoje ostarele roditelje i srodnike, ali većinom su se obavezali da im plaćaju skupu (za lokalne pojmove) skrb.

KOMENTARI

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Smještanje izmještenih fragmenata slomljenih tijela, država i obitelji

Članak Azre Hromadžić izvanredan je primjer etnografije koja se kreće između naoko dalekog i naoko bliskog, otkrivajući pritom da ništa nikada nije onakvo kakvim se činilo. Tu je Zemka, ne samo ispaćeno i krvlju umrljano tijelo, ne samo žrtva koju je društvo odbacilo, nego mjesto prijenosa značenja, gdje afektivna stvarnost dalekih drugih postaje dekodirana, interpretirana i vrijednosno određena. Ako se odmaknemo korak unazad od pitanja kako su skrb i napuštanje prisutni i koje učinke imaju na topografiju moći/znanja u poslijeratnoj Bosni, možemo se prije svega upitati zašto bi netko uopće skrbio o nekome kada je ta skrb neizostavno vezana uz mnoge probleme i proturječnosti? Zašto bi njena obitelj u "ratom uzrokovanom izbjeglištvu" u Njemačkoj (Hromadžić, u ovom broju), brinula ima li za Zemku mjesto u domu? Zašto bi daljnji rođak satima vozio da je tamo dopremi, bez obzira na to što prema njoj osjeća tek slabu povezanost? Zašto bi država skrabila o starijim građanima kao što je Zemka?

Očekivanja o tome tko bi trebao skrbiti o nekome, zašto, te što je to što sačinjava dobru skrb, stvaraju napetosti pune labilnih veza, nestabilnih i nesigurnih saveza. Zemkino ostarjelo tijelo i um čine je nesposobnom za bilo kakvo dulje putovanje, a opet, njena izmještenost povlači je od jedne institucije do druge. Ona nije pokretna, autonomna, ne može se osloniti na vlastite snage, ne može birati, riskirati. Međutim, Zemkina starost i bolest nisu dostatne da objasne njezinu ranjivost; ona je neodvojiva od politike skrbi koja se javlja u postsocijalističkoj, poslijeratnoj Bosni, ali i drugdje, jer svijet općenito postaje sve stariji.

Hromadžić uvjerljivo prikazuje Zemkinu "topografiju" starenja, taj slijed prekinutih odnosa i izdaja koji istodobno označavaju i njenu skrb i njeno napuštanje, "kao utjelovljenog simbola polu-odsutnosti države i obitelji" (Hromadžić, u ovom broju). To je ujedno i najveći doprinos toga rada, koji se podudara s etnografskim člancima o skrbi u drugim kontekstima kao što su *Life beside Itself* (2013) Lise Stevenson, *Precarious Japan* (2013), Anne Allison, Giordanova (2014) *Practices of Translation and the Making of Migrant Subjectivities in Contemporary Italy* i moj vlastiti rad *Aging and Loss* (Danely 2014). U svim tim slučajevima polu-odsutnosti države i obitelji ostavljale su za sobom ranjive pojedince u iščekivanju – život je nesiguran i nepredvidljiv, dodatno otežan dislokacijama kao što su rat i nasilje nad skrbi (usp. Wool 2015). Kao što je izjavila Lidija, sugovornica Azre Hromadžić: "Nitko ne zna što ga čeka" (Hromadžić, u ovom broju).

Možda je Zemkina demencija prikladan način da se ispuni taj prostor iščekivanja. Omogućuje joj utjehu u uvjerenju da će je njezin sin, čije pogibije u ratu ona nije svjesna, odvesti u Ameriku i pružiti joj i dom i obitelj. Zemkini simptomi čini se, pomiruju jedan set dislokacija (iz bolnice u dom za starije, iz Bosne u Njemačku u slučaju njenih kćeri, iz života u smrt u slučaju njenoga sina), s drugim (iz sadašnjosti u ne-sadašnjost, iz Bosne u Ameriku, od zanemarivanja do skrbi). Zemka, također, utjelovljuje jednu polu-odsutnost.

Taj kontekst iščekivanja ne zahvaća samo starije osobe, nego i one koji o njima brinu. Ne postoji nikakav čvrsti temelj pravedne, pa čak ni etičke, skrbi na koji bi se mogli osloniti. To je vrlo blisko mojim saznanjima do kojih sam došao na temelju istraživanja u Japanu, i iako me često pitaju što je bolje, obiteljska ili institucionalna skrb, znam da odgovor na to pitanje nikada nije jednostavan. U Japanu, kao i u uvjetima koje Hromadžić opisuje, obitelj nije postojana i čvrsta zajednica povezana jedinstvenim obrascima srodstva, niti su država i sustav skrbi centralizirani i racionalni. I o obitelji i o državi bolje je govoriti kao o "sklopovima" (Hromadžić, u ovom broju) koji stvaraju nestalan i kontradiktoran teren na kojem se očituje (ne)briga.

Hromadžić nas poziva da zamislimo "razlomljenu državu i razjedinjene obitelji" (Hromadžić, u ovom broju). Državnu skrb tu ne možemo jednostavno suprotstaviti obiteljskoj skrbi, kao što skrb ne možemo jednostavno okarakterizirati kao zajedničku ili "pluralnu" – jer bi to podrazumijevalo afektivnu i političku prilagodbu subjektivnosti radi zadovoljavanja etičkih principa. Obitelj koja brine o Zemkinjoj dobrobiti nije fizički prisutna, a prisutni "skrbnici", čini se, ne brinu. Polu-odsutnosti su ujedno i polu-priznavanja (*semi-recognitions*) samoga subjekta skrbi. Što utječe na ta polovična priznavanja (npr. novac, utjecaj, etnička pripadnost) i kako se ona tumače na način da dobivaju određenu vrijednost u kontekstu brige za starije? Što uopće možemo učiniti sa subjektom koji može biti samo djelomično priznat? Koja je moralna odgovornost obitelji ili države u tim slučajevima? Drugim riječima, tko snosi odgovornost za nasilje koje je počinjeno nad Zemkom i koje je u konačnici uzrokovalo njenu smrt? Iako su to sve većinom empirijska pitanja, ona su, prema mom mišljenju, iznimno važna ako želimo slijediti argumentaciju autorice Hromadžić i primijeniti je i na druge kontekste.

Naposlijetku, etnografija Azre Hromadžić otvara kritičku raspravu o tome koliko smo zapravo uistinu "tu" za druge. Jesu li polu-odsustva koja autorica opisuje uvijek prisutna u odnosima skrbi, posebice u međugeneracijskim odnosima? Mogli bismo se i upitati je li to uopće kvalitativno drugačije od okolnosti drugosti s kojima se mi antropolozi stalno susrećemo kada pišemo o Drugima? Iako me Zemkina priča, duboko estetska, emocionalno svakako potresla, svjestan sam svoga vlastitog polu-odsustva u odnosu na njeno stanje. Čitanje toga rada me također osupnulo, suočivši me sa, ne polu-odsustvom, nego stvarnim odsustvom žalovanja za ženom za čiji život moram vjerovati da je bio ispunjen, nadahnut i produktivan. Želimo li produbiti samu ideju polu-odsutnosti, to bi se najbolje moglo učiniti uz navođenje i uključivanje aspekata nasilja, žalovanja i narativa (usp. Das 2006; Jackson 2014), na načine koji bi dodatno rasvijetlili i propitali naše shvaćanje starenja.

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Javno je (i) individualno

Uvodni članak Azre Hromadžić predstavlja dobrodošao prilog, budući da otvara veoma važnu temu u etnološko-antropološkim studijama države i njenih institucija u regionu: problem sistemskog umanjivanja, pa i negiranja, udela lične odgovornosti pojedinca za sopstvenu sudbinu, uključujući tu i zdravstveno i socijalno blagostanje, prisutan u savremenim antropološkim istraživanjima povezanosti ekonomije, politike i kulture. Imajući u vidu ni-

zak stepen urbanizacije pre uspostavljanja komunističko-socijalističke države koja "brine", i njemu prethodeću haotičnu mešavinu tri društvena i državna uređenja (stranu kolonijalnu monarhiju koja je kombinovala feudalizam i kompanijski kapitalizam u nastajanju, lokalnu monarhiju s regionalnim ambicijama koja je kombinovala zadružni komunitarizam s državnim kapitalizmom u nastajanju, kao i lokalnu varijantu šerijatskog feudalizma s elementima robovlasništva u nastajanju), dakle gotovo zanemarivo prisustvo individualističke kulture, zemlje bivše Jugoslavije predstavljaju školski primer za analizu koncepata zajednice i pojedinca odnosno njihovog delatnog potencijala, a time i odgovornosti. Ovo posebno kada je o tranzicijskoj/postsocijalističkoj sudbini građana naših društava reč. Živeći na teritorijama na kojima je oduvek spoljašnji ili unutrašnji Drugi bio odgovoran/kriv i za kolektivnu i za individualnu sudbinu, građani bivših jugoslovenskih republika, pa tako i Bosne o kojoj je ovde specifično reč, imali su veoma retko sistemski podsticaj, osim retkih liberalnih¹⁵ zame-taka, da se izgrađuju kao odgovorne individue koje svesno snose posledice i ubiru zasluge za svoja dela ili svoja nečinjenja. Tako ovaj članak otvara važnu temu iako joj pristupa ideološki pristrasno, što je legitimno u kritičkoj antropologiji, opredeljujući se za u poslednje vreme uobičajenu levo orijentisanu antropološku kritiku razgradnje države blagostanja/socijalnog staranja i smanjenja obima i nivoa usluga uključenih u iz poreza finansirana socijalna davanja, pripisane "liberalizmu".

Autorka standardnom kombinacijom teza o krizi države blagostanja, prelomljenim kroz narative informanata, priča priču koju po potrebi i teorijski uobličava, o tome kako etnografsko istraživanje može da informiše, dopuni ali i demantuje standardna objašnjenja tranzicijskih procesa u postsocijalističkim društvima. Ipak, autorka ne uočava metodološku zamku u koju je etnografski fokus na lične narative uvlači: a) zamku nostalgije, posebno prisutne u postjugoslovenskim društvima, a možda najpre u bosanskom i b) zamku preuzimanja etnoeksplikativnog, dakle po pravilu znanja inferiornog ekspertskom etnološko-antropološkom naučnom znanju. Ove dve metodološke zamke značajno zakrivljuju zaključak ka odgovornosti države, nasuprot odgovornosti pojedinca, i ne uzimaju u obzir činjenje (nacionalizacija, eksproprijacija, konfiskacija, prinudno nezakonito oporezivanje, izostanak podsticaja na štednju i ulaganja) i nečinjenje (prepuštanje sopstvene sudbine kolektivu, opravdavanje izostanka lične brige za budućnost stvarnim ili navodnim sistemskim nemogućnostima) pre starosti.¹⁶

Osim toga, autorka propušta, što je inače manir u antropološim studijama post-socijalizma, da ponudi analizu stanja koje je prethodilo tekućoj devastaciji države socijalnog staranja. Nedostaje opis (ne)uspeha komunizma/realnog socijalizma da ostvari svoja obećanja, a posebno analiza razloga da li je on to uopšte bio u stanju, strukturno posmatrano (osim redistribucije kapitala koji su pojedinci ili preduzeća sticali, u kombinaciji sa zaduživanjem). Ono što nedostaje u ovom članku, a o čemu vredi povesti diskusiju ili ponovljeno/produženo istraživanje, jeste diskrepancija između informantskih nostalgičnih narativa o predkapitalističkom socijalnom staranju i naučne istine koja nam je poznata iz izvora i ek-

¹⁵ Društveni život pojma "liberal, liberalno" mogao bi biti ne samo prilika za antropološku polemiku već i za multilateralan projekat, imajući u vidu značaj sociokulturne promene nastale promenom političkog i ekonomskog uređenja ex-Yu država i društava tokom decenija za nama. Ovde ga koristim u njegovom izvornom značenju – poštovanje individualnih sloboda – a ne u njegovom prevažno američkom značenju ("socijalizam") ili pretežno balkanskom značenju ("antisocijalizam").

¹⁶ Ovo se, podrazumeva se, ne odnosi na situacije u kojima su žrtve rata bile prinudene da obezbede голу egzistenciju i, samim tim, nisu ni mogle da brinu unapred o kvalitetu života u starosti. Izuzev osoba koje su bile neposredno izložene ratnim dejstvima, u članku iznet argument se odnosi na sve osobe koje su poslednjih decenija živele u našim društvima i to je problem na koji ovde ukazujem. Argument, iznet u ovom članku, ne odnosi se na sve nas i ne može se koristiti kao osnova za razumevanje/opravljanje bilo čije pozicije osim pozicije osoba koje su neposredne ratne žrtve.

spertskih analiza. Nedostaje i temeljnije oslanjanje na postojeću, iako oskudnu, literaturu o starosti, penzijama, osiguranju, posebno o organizovanoj brizi o starima u jugoslovenskom kontekstu kao ključnom podtekstu ovde iznetog argumenta. Takvo dalje istraživanje bi nam omogućilo jasniju periodizaciju i kontekstualizaciju promena u javnom gerontološkom sistemu nakon razgradnje socijalističke države, imajući u vidu da je socijalistička država građanima sistematski oduzimala zarađena sredstva, koja dakle nisu mogli da ulažu u penzione i osiguravajuće fondove, istodobno im stvarajući zavisnost od dugoročno ekonomski neodrživog javnog sistema socijalne zaštite, s katastrofalnim posledicama po pojedinačne sudbine, posebno onih građana koji nisu uspjeli da izgrade mreže socijalne podrške tokom tranzicijskih godina. U tom smislu, bilo bi ne samo akademski interesantno već i društveno korisno kada bi autorka preciznije definisala procese koje pominje, imenovala aktere nedostajućih reformi koje priziva i uskladila tip analize sa zaključkom koji nudi, imajući u vidu to da se zaključci – isuviše opšti i veoma polemički plodni – nedokumentovano nadovezuju na prethodno iznetu analizu. Autorka nije dokazala, već podrazumeva, da je sistem socijalne zaštite, a posebno gerontološki, u bivšoj Jugoslaviji i Bosni posebno a) bio funkcionalan i b) da je bilo kakav sličan sistem u savremenoj Bosni održiv.

Članak predstavlja doprinos širenju debate o sociokulturnim posledicama, uključujući i ekonomske i pravne, konceptualizacije uloge države u životu pojedinca, kakva nam je u postjugoslovenskim etnologijama/antropologijama neophodna, posebno imajući u vidu sklonost antropologa da pristupaju neokolektivističkim antiliberalnim pokretima za koje, istorija nas uči, znamo da po pravilu provociraju fašizam u našim društvima i mogu predstavljati vajmarovski uvod u nove ratove, pljačkašku redistribuciju privatne imovine i uništavanje javnog u ime kolektivnog. Upravo brkanje javnog i kolektivnog, prisutno i u ovom članku, predlažem za dalju polemiku ukoliko se za nju ukaže prilika.

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“Dom bi nam trebao, ali bi bilo ružno dati roditelja u dom, sramota!”
Formalna i neformalna skrb za starije u Hrvatskoj

Od kraja 20. i u prvim desetljećima 21. stoljeća, promatramo li europski prostor, sve je prisutnija nesigurnost po pitanju toga kako se nositi s društvenim i ekonomskim promjenama koje slijede iz sve zrelije demografske strukture društva. Uz ubrzano starenje stanovništva, sve veći broj starijih koji (sve duže) žive sami i u starosti trebaju tuđu pomoć, znanstvena pozornost usmjerena je na (ekonomski) održive i (društveno) potrebne vrste i modalitete skrbi. Znanstvenici pokušavaju odgovoriti na pitanja postaju li brojni stariji ljudi (pre)težak teret suvremenoj obitelji (još uvijek glavnom nositelju neformalne skrbi) i ekonomski sve češće nedovoljno jakoj državi (nositelju formalnih oblika skrbi) (Sundström i Johansson 2005; Podgorelec i Klempić 2007). Mijenjaju li se, pritom, očekivanja društva od pojedinih članova obitelji, prije svega žene kao glavnog pružatelja skrbi (s obzirom na njezinu radnu karijeru), odnosno razina međugeneracijske solidarnosti članova? Mijenjaju li se očekivanja starijih o tome tko bi trebao biti glavni pružatelj skrbi? Što za kvalitetu života starijih znači sve veća komercijalizacija skrbi?

Usporedbe podataka triju zadnjih popisa stanovništva pokazuju "da stanovništvo Hrvatske obilježavaju brzo starenje i visoki stupanj ostarjelosti" (Nejašmić i Toskić 2013: 92), odnosno prema prosječnoj dobi stanovništva koja je iznosila 41,7 godina (2011) Hrvatska "spada u red europskih zemalja s najvećom ostarjelošću populacije" (Živić, Turk i Pokos 2014: 248). Rast udjela stanovnika starih 65 i više godina, uz povećanje udjela skupine starijih starih ljudi (80 i stariji), među kojima je i najveći broj bolesnih i potrebnih tuđe njege i skrbi, predstavlja veliki izazov za sustav zdravstva, socijalne skrbi i mirovinski sustav zemlje, posebice u ruralnim područjima u kojima je razina institucionalne i izvaninstitucionalne skrbi daleko manje razvijena u odnosu na urbane dijelove zemlje.

Komentar na raspravu Azre Hromadžić o "krizi skrbi" za starije u Bosni i Hercegovini u drugom desetljeću 2000-ih, zamišljen je kao svojevrsna nadopuna tema u kojima autorica spominje neke probleme i podatke vezane uz skrb o starima u Hrvatskoj. Točnije, na temelju istraživanja provedenih uglavnom u ruralnim prostorima Hrvatske, pokušat ćemo podastrijeti neke uzorke skrbi za starije u Hrvatskoj i naznačiti početak promjena u očekivanjima potencijalnih primatelja prema pružateljima skrbi.

Migracije – ograničavajući uvjet pružateljima neformalne skrbi

Stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine te Hrvatske, bez obzira na to o kojoj je generaciji riječ, mladima ili starima, dijele posljedice razdoblja zajedničke povijesti koja je značajno utjecala na način njihova života danas. Za većinu pojedinaca (obitelji) posljedice su, prije svega, razne vrste gubitaka koje se ogledaju u padu ekonomskog statusa (nerijetko i siromaštvu), promjeni kvalitete društvenih mreža (uglavnom njihovom sužavanju) i promjeni društvenih normi i temeljnih vrijednosti (na razini države, lokalne zajednice i obitelji). S obzirom na razinu tempa starenja jednog ili drugog društva, probleme vezane uz način života suvremene obitelji i uzroke promjena odnosa zajednice i države prema skrbi o starijima nužno je promatrati i u kontekstu migracija. Naime, znatan dio stanovništva u radno-aktivnoj dobi (posebice od kraja 1960-ih) sudjelovao je u migracijama potaknutim najčešće ekonomskim razlozima, koje su u posljednjih 25 godina osnažene brojnim dobrovoljnim i/ili prisilnim seljenjima čiji su uzroci, prije svega, raspad zajedničke države i rat (1990-ih) vođen na teritorijima obiju zemalja te političke, gospodarske i društvene posljedice ratnih razaranja, zločina nad stanovništvom i razni oblici (najčešće gospodarskog) kriminala. Svi navedeni razlozi jasno se očitavaju u izmijenjenim uvjetima skrbi za starije u obje države.

Javne politike u Hrvatskoj sklone su probleme vezane uz starenje društva i skrb o starijima potrebnima tuđe pomoći i njege maskirati izjednačavanjem problema s (pre)velikom brojem umirovljenika u odnosu na broj zaposlenih, koji predstavlja nepremostiv materijalni teret za ekonomiju društva u krizi. Među umirovljenicima, kao i u drugim tranzicijskim državama na prostoru bivše SFR Jugoslavije, veliki je dio onih koji su s tržišta rada izišli daleko prije dobne granice za starosno umirovljenje (60 ili 65 godina), dakle prije prelaska praga iz razdoblja kasne zrelosti u razdoblje mlade starosti. Uzrok gomilanja (i mladih) umirovljenika posljedica je, u prvom redu, prijelaza iz planske u tržišnu ekonomiju i pretvorbe vlasništva koja je tu promjenu pratila, zatim rat i njegove posljedice te višedesetljetna pogrešna gospodarska politika.

Hromadžić, uz raspravu o aspektima (nedovoljne) prisutnosti države u skrbi za stare i nemoćne, već samim naslovom rada, "A gdje su oni bili dosad?", naznačuje težinu posljedica

transformacije bosansko-hercegovačkog društva, posebice na razini odnosa unutar obitelji. Obitelj i lokalna zajednica i u Bosni i Hercegovini i u Hrvatskoj od 1990-ih do danas bile su i još su uvijek izložene raznim vrstama uglavnom negativnih pritisaka. Primjerice, (ne)moćnost zapošljavanja, odnosno gubitak velikog broja radnih mjesta i visoka nezaposlenost pretežno mladih (uzrok znatnog osiromašenja velikog dijela stanovništva u obje zemlje), promjena strukture obitelji koja je glavni pružatelj skrbi svojim članovima (sve manji broj djece, a sve više ostarjelih), značajno iseljavanje mladih, posebice iz ruralnih područja, a s ulaskom Hrvatske u Europsku uniju (omogućavanjem zapošljavanja hrvatskim građanima u nekim državama EU) sve značajnije iseljavanje i iz urbanih dijelova zemlje. Iskustvo seljenja utječe na promjenu načina života članova obitelji koji u migraciji sudjeluju, ali i na očekivanja onih, najčešće starijih, koji ostaju. Promatramo li Hrvatsku u kontekstu ratnih raseljavanja, dio stanovništva, i Hrvata i Srba, nije se nakon mirne reintegracije, odnosno infrastrukturne i stambene obnove porušenih objekata vratio u Hrvatsku. "Dugotrajnost prognaništva i izbjeglištva učinila je da se dio (...) posebice mladih stanovnika prilagodio životu u novoj sredini i ne želi se vratiti" (Klempić Bogadi i Lajić 2014: 448). Dakle, u većem broju vratili su se uglavnom stariji pa istraživanja potvrđuju da je "čak 30 posto povratničke populacije [je] starije od 65 godina", a s obzirom na kvalitetu života [i mogućnost dobivanja bilo kojeg oblika neformalne pomoći] posebice su ugrožena brojna staračka samačka kućanstva čija je prosječna starost 70 godina (Mesić i Bagić 2011: 85–87). Znatno dio povratnika vratio se u nerazvijena, periferna ruralna područja, u kojima je nedovoljno razvijena zdravstvena zaštita i gdje uglavnom nedostaju svi oblici formalne skrbi.

Organizacija formalne skrbi – prisutnost države

Hromadžić navodi da je Hrvatska u bivšoj državi imala najširu mrežu institucionalne skrbi za starije građane. Što se događa s tim sustavom danas? Prema podacima Ministarstva socijalnog rada i mladih za 2015. institucijski smještaj starih građana Hrvatske organiziran je u okviru 226 ustanova za starije i nemoćne (državni i županijski domovi te sve veći broj domova drugih osnivača i pravnih osoba koje pružaju smještaj bez osnivanja doma: udruge, vjerske zajednice i dr.). U domovima za starije i nemoćne smješteno je 17 536¹⁷ starijih osoba. Uspoređujući brojke s podacima od prije deset godina¹⁸ bilježi se kontinuirano širenje mreže institucionalne skrbi (posebice broj komercijalnih vrsta smještaja) kao i rast broja (udjela)¹⁹ starijih građana smještenih u domove za starije i nemoćne. Uz institucionalnu pokrivenost, podjednako je važna, i to posebice za ruralne sredine, organizacija izvaninstitucijskih oblika skrbi pa je tako prema podacima za 2015. godinu 5 655²⁰ starijih i nemoćnih osoba smješteno u obiteljske domove i udomiteljske obitelji.

¹⁷ Što čini 2,31% ukupne populacije starijih i nemoćnih osoba.

¹⁸ Prema podacima Ministarstva zdravstva i socijalne skrbi, krajem 2006. u domovima za stare i nemoćne bilo je smješteno 12 233 starijih osoba ili 1,8% stanovništva u dobi od 65 i više godina.

¹⁹ Povećanje udjela je još značajnije ako se uzme u obzir starenje ukupnog stanovništva.

²⁰ Ili 0,75% ukupne populacije starijih, što s onima smještenima u domove za starije i nemoćne čini preko 3% ukupne starije populacije.

Međugeneracijska solidarnost – prisutnost članova obitelji

Za starije ljude u ruralnim područjima u kojima se visoka razina aktivnosti zadržava do u duboku starost²¹ (Podgorelec 2008; Podgorelec i Klempić Bogadi 2013; Klempić Bogadi i Podgorelec 2014) i u kojima su još uvijek glavna očekivanja stanovništva da će, kada za to dođe vrijeme, skrb o ostarjelom članu obitelji preuzeti na prvom mjestu bračni partner, a onda djeca (od kojih je najveći broj odselio i živi u drugim dijelovima Hrvatske ili u inozemstvu) ili neki drugi bliži član obitelji, od iznimne je važnosti osiguranje pomoći i njege u domovima²² starijih osoba. Izuzetno su se učinkovitim pokazali razni izvaninstitucijski programi poput "Pomoći u kući starijim osobama" i "Dnevni boravak i pomoć u kući starijim osobama", kojima je obuhvaćeno još 15 550 starijih osoba, i to većinom u ruralnim, nerijetko izoliranim i snažno depopuliranim područjima Hrvatske. Jedan od takvih programa provodi se zapošljavanjem gerontodomaćica koje svakodnevno obilaze domove starijih i nemoćnih stanovnika. Ogledni program provodi(o) se na malim šibenskim otocima, a njime su obuhvaćene većinom starije osobe u samačkim kućanstvima, teže bolesne i funkcionalno slabije sposobne, u visokoj starosnoj dobi, bez djece ili s odseljenom djecom (Podgorelec i Klempić Bogadi 2013). Ocjena je djelatnika šibenskog Centra za pomoć i njegu da je u posljednjih šest godina većina starijih kojima su pružane usluge u okviru njihova doma, ostala živjeti na otocima do visoke dobi (prosjeck između 75 i 80 godina), duže funkcionalno sposobni i samostalni nego osobe iste dobi u gradu.

Očekivanja (potencijalnih) primatelja skrbi

Utječu li navedene društvene promjene na stavove potencijalnih primatelja, ali i pružatelja skrbi? Postupna promjena u očekivanjima o tome tko bi, uz obitelj, trebao biti aktivan nositelj skrbi u starosti odraz je promjene u životnom stilu novih generacija. Posebice kada je riječ o ruralnim prostorima, koji su bili izloženi ratnim razaranja ili perifernim prostorima malih hrvatskih otoka, teška gospodarska situacija, materijalno osiromašenje stanovništva, nedovoljan broj institucija za socijalnu i zdravstvenu skrb za stare i nemoćne te neadekvatna (ili nepostojeća) organizacija izvaninstitucijske skrbi još uvijek iziskuju jaku međugeneracijsku solidarnost roditelja i djece (Podgorelec 2008; Knodel et al. 2010; Heylen 2010; Klempić Bogadi i Podgorelec 2011). Jedan od sugovornika (M, 75), razmišljajući o potencijalnoj nemoći, kaže: "Bojim li se starosti? Računam na djecu, nadam se. Sretan sam što ih imam!"

Međugeneracijska potpora izražava se uzajamnim djelovanjem, ljubavlju ili pomoći u obliku novca i usluga. Dio ispitanika u srednjoj i starijoj zrelosti i dalje osjeća da je odgovornost za skrb o ostarjelim roditeljima isključivo njihova, zbog čega su se pojedinci odlučili i prije umirovljenja u gradovima (u koje su odselili zbog školovanja i/ili zaposlenja) vratiti u svoja mjesta (na otocima) kako bi skrbili za roditelje (Podgorelec i Klempić Bogadi 2013).

I dok mlađi članovi obitelji (odrasla djeca) sve češće prihvaćaju mogućnost da bi se u pomoć, njegu i skrb, kada je oni ne mogu²³ (ili ne bi mogli) pružiti, djelomice uključila i

²¹ Što nerijetko dovodi do potrebe za tuđom njegom i skrbi sve kasnije u životu pojedinca i ta skrb traje kraće nego nekada (Sundström i Johansson 2005).

²² Organiziranu pomoć i njegu, prema podacima za 2015., u okviru svojih domova dobiva ukupno 5 083 starijih građana Hrvatske.

²³ Mnogi su odselili iz svojih sela i malih mjesta, kao i u primjeru Zemke i njezine obitelji. Ovdje nam nije u prvom planu razlog seljenja, premda nije zanemariv, već činjenica da stariji sve češće ostaju sami.

država (institucije), stariji i dalje skrb uglavnom očekuju od članova neposredne obitelji pa tako sugovornici navode: "Nekada su se u obitelji brinuli za starije, a danas, sramota, za tebe bi se trebao brinuti stranac u nekom domu" (M, 82 g.) ili "[Nekada] nije nam trebao dom jer je bila mladost koja je sa starim svitom živila" (Ž, 87). Pomoć se očekuje na prvom mjestu od bračnih partnera i odrasle djece, a potom drugih članova obitelji, prijatelja i susjeda (Sundström i Johansson 2005; Podgorelec 2008). Ipak, način života sve većeg broja starijih koji žive sami, a djeca im ne žive u blizini, dovodi do postupne promjene stavova prema očekivanjima o tome tko sve treba biti pružatelj skrbi, pri čemu institucijski smještaj ili neki oblik izvaninstitucijske skrbi postaje prihvatljiviji nego nekada:

Ima puno starih ljudi. Ali nema niko a da se neko o njemu ne brine. Ako baš su stari, onda imaju starosni dom tamo, ki nima nikoga. Je starih, ma nema nezbrinutih, kako bih rekla. (Ž, 86)

Najprije sam zadovoljan što me dragi bog čuva da sam još zdrav. I sutra, pazite, padneš u krevet, ko će te? Djeca su daleko! (M, 77)

Najbolje je, "aj, dome, domiću", kako ono se reče, poslovice, najlepše je doma ako je moguće. Ali mi ni moguće doma bit. Nima ni suseda, ni niš, a šta ću sama doma? (Ž, 94)

Današnji mladi stari zamjećuju postupnu promjenu očekivanja prema institucijskoj skrbi u odnosu na raniju generaciju navodeći:

Ljudi na dom gledaju kao na zadnju postaju u životu. Ali ja mislim da to ne bi trebalo tako gledat, nego trebalo bi biti sretan da možeš kao čovjek umrijeti... to je prije bila sramota, a sad je manje nego prije. Bolje da je tamo na sigurnom, bimo rekli, nego da je doma i da mu se dogodi nešto. Jer danas kad mladih nema, nema ko... Ne znam, moja je mama uvijek govorila: "Valjda me nećete staviti u starački dom." Ta generacija nije to prihvaćala. (Ž, 67)

Umjesto zaključka

Neformalna skrb i dalje je glavni oblik skrbi za starije stanovništvo Hrvatske. Samačka kućanstva sve su češća u ruralnim područjima Hrvatske, koja su i najslabije pokrivena formalnim oblicima skrbi za starije. Za starije osobe koje žive same i koje nemaju u blizini nekog člana obitelji koji bi im mogao pružiti podršku i pomoć kada je zatrebaju, najprihvatljivija formalna vrsta pomoći ili skrbi je ona koju mogu dobiti unutar svoga doma. Djeca, s jedne strane, koja su, uz bračne partnere, i dalje glavni pružatelji skrbi, ali i njihovi ostarjeli roditelji, žele imati mogućnost izbora dobivanja pomoći u nekom obliku organizirane (formalne) skrbi od strane države, kojoj zbog ekonomske slabosti osiguravanje takve skrbi sve češće predstavlja problem.

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Napuštanje i/ili povezanost: promišljanje srodstva, starenja i transformacija

Azra Hromadžić u svojem tekstu na osnovi etnografskoga primjera vrši analizu i interpretaciju. Okosnica je kratka, ali etnografski bogata obiteljska situacija u kojoj osamdesetogodišnja starica, udovica i majka četvoro djece, triju odraslih živućih kćeri i jednoga, u zadnjemu ratu u Bosni, smrtno stradalog sina, biva iz bolničkog liječenja u teškom zdravstvenom stanju premještena u privatni dom umirovljenika u kojem, nekoliko dana po dolasku, umire. Po njezinoj smrti kćeri, koje od progonstva 1990-ih godina ne žive u Bosni, nego u Njemačkoj, dolaze u dom umirovljenika i emocionalno uzavrelom raspravom iznose razočaranost i pogođenost bosanskim zdravstvenim sustavom koji je, nakon liječničke obrade u javnoj bolnici, staricu otpustio, nevoljko je zadržavši tek dan i nipošto duže.

Ta obiteljska situacija, zabilježena promatranjem i razgovorom s protagonistima, relevantan je primjer za analizu i tumačenje obiteljskih, društvenih, političkih i socijalnih odnosa. Autorica govori o društvenim vrijednostima vezanim uz državu i obitelj kao institucijama brige za starije osobe, te o društvenim očekivanjima koja se odražavaju primjerice u komentaru upraviteljice privatnog doma za starije, upućenog istraživačici, a koji se odnosio na članove obitelji preminule starice: "A gdje su oni bili dosad?" Ta priča pokazuje kako životna situacija može biti pokretač posljedičnih prijepornih obiteljskih i društvenih odnosa. Ilustrativan je etnografski primjer jer sadržava intimne i slojevite podatke o mišljenjima, postupcima i vrijednostima.

Starenje – kao iskustvo i kao koncept – je nedovoljno etnološki i kulturnoantropološki istraženo i problematizirano. Smatramo kako nema univerzalnoga iskustva starenja, premda postoje određene "opće" transformacije vezane uz stariju generaciju na širem planu: npr. suvremeni demografski i socijalnopolitički izazovi poput starenja populacije ili produženoga životnog vijeka, krize socijalne sigurnosti te "klasičnih" mirovinskih i obiteljskih sustava. Tu su i razni regionalni izazovi sve većeg broja starijih ljudi koji žive sami (npr. otnedavna vrlo izražen problem u Kini), kao i (npr. u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama) postojanje moralno problematičnih politika raspodjele zdravstvenih resursa eksplicitno na osnovi dobi (pri čemu su starije osobe na gubitku) itd.

U smislu važnosti promišljanja svih tih i drugih procesa vezanih uz starenje, prilog Azre Hromadžić smatramo etnografski iznimno relevantnim. Međutim, u nastavku našeg komentara ukazujemo i na određene problematične točke u analizi i interpretaciji.

Etnološka i kulturnoantropološka tumačenja koja se formiraju na razini primjera, nerijetko mogu skliznuti u "zamku" kada se interpretacija temeljena na anegdotalnom primjeru postavlja na širu razinu. Autorica u svom radu, kako ističe u uvodnom dijelu, promatra i problematizira brigu za starije osobe u ratnoj i poratnoj Bosni i Hercegovini. U dijakronijskoj

²⁴ Tihana Rubić istraživanje je provela u okviru projekta "City-making: space, culture, and identity / Stvaranje grada: prostor, kultura i identitet", koji financira Hrvatska zaklada za znanost (br. 2350).

perspektivi tumačenja i podaci odnose se na socijalističko, postsocijalističko i suvremeno razdoblje, a u jednom se dijelu rada autorica dotiče i predsocijalističkoga doba – tumačeći karakteristike institucije “tradicijske” obitelji, njezinih unutarnjih odnosa i vrijednosti.

Suprotstavljajući temeljno dva razdoblja – socijalističko – kada je formalno-institucionalna briga za starije osobe, prema autorici, postojala, te postsocijalističko, ratno i poratno – kada ti raniji obrasci brige, prema autorici, doživljavaju krizu i postupno iščezavaju, autorica etnografsku priču koja je okosnica njezina rada tumači na način da je i “sudbina” te starice u postsocijalističkom i poslijeratnom kontekstu, takva kakva jest, bila neminovna. Riječju, da je direktan odraz tijekova degradacije formalno-institucijskih, ali i obiteljskih vidova skrbi i podrške, uzrokovane ponajviše ostrim rezom koji je učinio rat devedesetih godina 20. stoljeća, raselivši obitelji i rastrgavši (neposredne, fizičke) veze: “zbog ratom uzrokovanog izbjeglištva, mnoge obitelji nisu mogle ispuniti ta očekivanja o ‘skrbi iz blizine’, što je rezultiralo velikim pomacima u poslijeratnim i postsocijalističkim shvaćanjima skrbi...” (Hromadžić, u ovom broju).

Premda nam se ta teza može učiniti bliskom, ona zahtjeva kompleksnije propitivanje makroprocessa, između ostalih onih koji su se odvijali tijekom 20. stoljeća na planu socijalne sigurnosti – one koju je pružala Država, i one koju je pružala obitelj – te njihova međusobnog odnosa. Skrb za starije u socijalizmu i skrb za starije u postsocijalističkom/poslijeratnom razdoblju donose se kao dva dijametralno različita okvira u tekstu te se polazi od činjenice da ih ukupno odlikuje diskontinuitet. Rat je nesumnjivo donio rezove, promjene i stradanja. Numerički pokazatelji to dodatno potvrđuju – procjenjuje se da je u posljednjem ratu na teritoriju Bosne i Hercegovine izgubljeno “oko 100.000 ljudi, a oko 2.700.000 je prognano” (Grbić Jakopović 2011: 317–318). U mnogim je europskim zemljama tih godina izražen upravo takav val emigracija, prognanika i izbjeglica iz Bosne, pa tako, primjerice, finska antropologinja Laura Huttunen piše o transformacijama na planu društvene i etničke strukture u Finskoj devedesetih godina 20. stoljeća, čime pokazuje razmjere useljavanja uslijed ratnih okolnosti devedesetih godina u tu zemlju: “Gotovo svi Bosanci u Finskoj stigli su kao izbjeglice tijekom ili neposredno nakon rata u Bosni i većinom su Bosanci Muslimani/Bošnjaci ili miješanoga podrijetla” (Huttunen 2008: 236). Ratni sukob u zemljama bivše Jugoslavije stvorio je okruženje koje “proizvodi maksimalnu nesigurnost pripadnika svih dobnih skupina” (Podgorelec 2008: 31).

Međutim, osim diskontinuiteta, postoje i kontinuiteti, jer ljudi nisu “preko noći” na svim razinama 1990-ih godina počeli živjeti prema novom modelu. Naime, Bosna i Hercegovina je, poput ostalih zemalja regije, tradicionalno iseljenička zemlja (Čapo i Jurčević 2014: 18). Migracije (političke, ekonomske...) kontinuum su njezinih i ratnih i mirnodopskih razdoblja. Uslijed migracija obiteljska bi zajednica iznova iznalazila mehanizme vlastitog održanja (ekonomskog, simboličkog i dr.) čak i tada kada ne bi dijelila isti fizički prostor. Moderna antropologija već dugo poznaje koncept dislociranosti i transnacionalnih društvenih prostora – onih “koji nadrastaju jedno fizičko mjesto i ostvaruju se u procesima suvremene migracije, izmiještanja i umiještanja” (Čapo i Gulin Zrnić 2011: 13; usp. Vuorela 2008). Ti se “prostori” interpretiraju prije kao prilagodba i transformacija, nego kao degradacija društvenih (mahom obiteljskih) veza i odnosa:

(t)emeljem transnacionalne paradigme istraživači počinju promatrati migrante unutar transnacionalnih društvenih polja koja stvaraju između i ponad međudržavnih granica održavajući guste, višestruke društvene odnose koji povezuju njihova društva, podrijetla i prijama (...) [Veze i odnosi] povezuju dva ili više prostora i ljude koji u njima žive, kao i od kruženja stvari, novca i usluga između tih dvaju prostora lociranih u dvije države (...).

Budući da se ta intenzivna razmjena zbiva na razini obitelji i rodbinskih mreža te lokaliteta u kojima žive (...) [govorimo o] o paralelnim višestrukim razinama socijalnih mreža. (Čapo i Jurčević 2014: 24)

U okolnostima stalnih emigracija obitelji su izazove i promjene u strukturi obitelji, te dijelom i dezintegracije (“tradicijskih” odnosa), doživljavale i prije zadnjega rata. Dezintegracija tradicionalnih institucija, primjerice trogeneracijskog domaćinstva, kako uočava norveška socijalna antropologinja Tone Bringa (2009: 49), odvijala se u Bosni i u desetljećima prije 1990-ih godina, pa i u zemljama “zapadne demokracije” (usp. Podgorelec 2008: 31). Te procese bilježimo npr. i polovinom 1970-ih godina, otkada se “svakodnevni odnosi odvijaju (...) s višim stupnjem otvorenosti i nesigurnosti” (Podgorelec 2008: 31). U tom smislu, istaknuta sadržajna distinkcija socijalizam–postsocijalizam, prijeratni i poslijeratni kontekst, tek je jedan od mogućih aspekata duboke kompleksnosti (transformacija i opstojnosti) društvenih (napose obiteljskih) odnosa.

S druge strane, unatoč uvriježenom poimanju socijalističkoga razdoblja kao razdoblja socijalne “sigurnosti”, imamo tek uži okvir, 1950-e i 1960-e godine, koji bismo mogli nazvati “zlatnim dobom” (Grandits 2010: 25) “sigurnosti” – države blagostanja – i to u širem, europskom, kontekstu (ibid.). Primjerice, od toga razdoblja do danas traje proces destabilizacije socijalne države i države blagostanja, koji se dodatno ubrzao od kraja 1980-ih godina, naročito u zemljama s intenzivnim političko-ekonomskim restrukturiranjem, na prijelazu iz socijalizma u novi ekonomsko-politički sustav. Želimo istaknuti da čak ni u spomenutom “zlatnom dobu” sektori poput stambenog, zdravstvenog, industrijskog, socijalnog i dr. na praktičnoj, izvedbenoj razini, nisu korelirali diskursu: unatoč ideologiji i težnji, resursi su uvijek bili skromni i limitirani. Dakle, dio u kojemu Hromadžić govori o ranijoj zbrinutosti, sigurnosti i državi koja brine o svojim stanovnicima, poput “velikog oca”, ticao bi se ipak više diskursa, nego same prakse pa nam se čini da je i razlika između dvaju supostavljenih razdoblja u tekstu predimenzionirana. Konačno, obitelj je u tom kontekstu, posljedično, uvijek prisutna kao izvor podrške, brige i pomoći (socijalne sigurnosti), “emocionalno uvjetovana i društveno utemeljena skrb” kako u socijalizmu, tako i u postsocijalizmu (usp. Heady 2010; Grandits 2010; Rubić i Leutloff 2015), ali uvijek dakako i sa svojim unutarnjim nesuglasjima i izazovima.

Željeli bismo kratko komentirati i svoja očekivanja iz autoričine najave u sažetku teksta, koja su nas zaintrigirala te koja indiciraju i neka naša istraživanja (npr. Rubić 2012), kako će u radu biti kritičkih osvrta i pozicioniranja prema pojmu “običnih ljudi”, kako Hromadžić najavljuje: “Termin ‘obični ljudi’ u ovome radu koristim s posebnim oprezom. (...) ‘svakodnevno’ je mjesto na kojem se politika odvija na dubokoj razini.” Smatramo kako su “obični ljudi” prije svega (uvriježena) diskurzivna kategorija u kolektivnim predodžbama i naracijama, i da nose implicitna značenja i potencijal politizacije. Međutim, u tekstu nismo detektirale najavljeni kritički odmak, već autoričinu uporabu problematičnih pojmova poput: “većina ljudi”, “obični ljudi”, “obični Bosanci”.

Ukoliko postoje ambicije da se stvari tumače na široj razini od obiteljskih odnosa, a u tekstu postoje, tada je jedan obiteljski primjer, tj. suvremeni i recentni isječci obiteljskoga života, ipak nedovoljno ekstenzivan i traži dodatna i šira etnografska istraživanja i drugih obiteljskih i pojedinačnih priča, kojima bi se pri analizi i interpretaciji direktno nadišla anegdotalna razina. Analizirati jedan primjer je posve legitiman metodološki postupak, ali zahtjeva ekstenzivniji studijski i arhivski rad (usp. Vuorela 2008). Imajući u vidu kompleksnost tema koje se u radu nastoje zahvatiti te autoričinu pretenziju tumačenja procesa i događaja širih od

obiteljskoga primjera, čini nam se da tako postavljen interpretativni i analitički cilj zahtjeva i dodatan etnografski ili studijski materijal.

Rad bi, mišljenja smo, sadržajno obogatila naznaka, pa i problematiziranje, izazova vlastite emske/etske istraživačke pozicije u bavljenju “vlastitim” nacionalnim društvenim, kulturnim, ekonomskim i političkim okruženjem kao istraživačkim “terenom”. Na kojim razinama je ta pozicija etska, a na kojima emska? Prisjetimo se Claude Lévi-Straussovih opservacija o vlastitoj istraživačkoj poziciji u Francuskoj pedesetih godina 20. stoljeća kada svjedoči, zajedno sa svojim sugrađanima – suvremenicima događanju javnoga pogubljenja Djeda Mraza 1952. godine u Dijonu, događanju koje utjelovljuje političko-religijsko-ritualne i konzumerističko-modernizacijske prijepore ondašnjega francuskog društva. Lévi-Strauss piše:

(...) činjenice koje se odvijaju pred našim očima i kojima je teatar naše društvo u isti mah lakše i teže rasuđivati. Lakše zbog toga što je očuvan kontinuitet iskustva, sa svim njegovim momentima i njihovim nijansama i teže zato što u takvim i vrlo rijetkim prilikama uočavamo krajnju složenost društvenih preobrazbi, čak i onih najusmjerenijih; i zato što su prividni razlozi koje pripisujemo događajima čiji smo akteri vrlo različiti od stvarnih uzroka koji nam u tim događajima pridaju određenu ulogu. (Lévi-Strauss 2014: 15)

Na sličan način, analitički i interpretativno, u prezentaciji materijala oprezno, pristupa i Tone Bringa baveći se religijskim identitetom muslimana u Bosni i Hercegovini osamdesetih godina 20. stoljeća. Ona studiju uvodno eksplicitno pozicionira kao jednu od mogućih priča te tu poziciju dosljedno provodi kroz tekst koji čitamo u knjizi nedavno objavljenoj i prevedenoj na bosanski jezik:

(o)vo je priča o životima nekih od (...) ljudi, i nekim aspektima zajednice u kojoj su živjeli. Budući da se desila u jednom naročitom povijesnom trenutku, ona je usredotočena na živote nekoliko izrazitih predstavnika jedne specifične seoske zajednice u tom vremenu. Ona ne teži da bude pripovijest o svemu što jeste Bosna i njen narod, ali jeste detaljna studija jedne šare na bosanskom ćilimu. (Bringa 2009: 3)

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Starenje, transformacije i mnogostruke krize skrbi u Bosni i Hercegovini

Skica iz života i smrti gospođe Zemke, koju nam predstavlja autorica Azra Hromadžić, važna je, potresna i tragična i iznimno nam mnogo govori o mnogostrukim krizama skrbi, socijalnoj pomoći i starenju u suvremenoj Bosni i Hercegovini. Autoričino tumačenje onoga što naziva “polu-odsutnostima” i obitelji i države u kontekstu poslijeratnih i postkomunističkih tranzicija, omogućava joj da otkrije obrasce, procese i prakse koji gotovo potpuno nedostaju u bogatoj znanstvenoj literaturi posvećenoj Bosni i Hercegovini, koja je kruto usmjerena na “etno-nacionalizam”. Njen tekst otkriva mnogo više od “pogleda odozgo ili pogleda od nikud” unutar vrlo skromne literature o socijalnoj politici i socijalnoj zaštiti u toj zemlji. Ne radi se samo o tome da “skrb koja je nekom dostupna još uvelike ovisi o tome gdje osoba živi” (Maglajlić Holiček i Rašidagić 2007: 163) u suvremenoj Bosni i Hercegovini, nego o tome da, kao što je ovdje slučaj, bihačka Kantonalna bolnica, nakon što je navodno “učinila sve što

je mogla”, smatra da ima potpuno pravo odgovornost prebaciti na Zemkinu obitelj, u vrlo kratkom vremenu, pri tom izazvajući veliku krizu i, nesumnjivo, pridonijevši Zemkinjoj smrti.

Kriza skrbi o kojoj se raspravlja u tekstu ne dešava se, naravno, samo u Bosni i Hercegovini. Demografsko starenje fenomen je koji zahvaća cijelu Europu i u mnogim zemljama vidljivi su učinci triju zajedničkih procesa: povećanog očekivanja trajanja života, iako ne nužno i godina dobrog zdravlja; niska reproduktivnost i sve manji broj novorođenih; te značajna emigracija radno sposobnog stanovništva. Smanjenje broja stanovništva se, dakle, često podudara sa sve većim brojem stanovništva ovisnog o tuđoj njezi, povećanjem broja i omjera osoba starijih od osamdeset godina, te povećanjem broja osoba koje godinama žive u uvjetima lošeg zdravlja, nemoći, nepokretnosti i, zapravo, siromaštva i društvenog isključivanja. Demografske promjene ugrožavaju održivost uobičajenih zdravstvenih sustava i sustava socijalne skrbi koji su bili bazirani na osiguranju jer su se oslanjali na pretpostavku da će populacija radno sposobnog stanovništva biti dovoljno brojna, da će dovoljan broj zaposlenih raditi dovoljno dugo za dovoljno velike naknade i time osigurati davanja i povlastice za djecu i za starije osobe kao i za nezaposlene odrasle osobe i osobe s posebnim potrebama.

Promjene u strukturi obitelji, u očekivanjima međugeneracijskih prava i odgovornosti, te raseljavanje prošireni obitelji na ponekad vrlo velike udaljenosti, još su dodatno uvećali navedene izazove. Promjenjiva uloga države, sveobuhvatno restrukturiranje i općenito raspadanje tzv. “država blagostanja”, zajedno sa sve većom ulogom dobrovoljnih, neprofitnih i privatnih sektora, također su čimbenici koje treba uzeti u obzir. Ta restrukturiranja često reproduciraju starije ideje o podjelama na one koji “zaslužuju” i one koji “ne zaslužuju”, te time nameću “moralizirajuće” i “otrežnjujuće” osude onima koji se nisu bili u stanju brinuti za članove vlastite obitelji, što sve tjera institucije javnog zdravstva i socijalne skrbi da donose teške odluke time da maksimaliziraju učinke i smanje troškove.

Korisnici pomoći više ne bi trebali biti “pasivni” primatelji naknada, već se od njih očekuje da su “aktivni” na mnogim poljima. Oni koji dulje žive trebali bi dulje i raditi, putem “financijske pismenosti” trebali bi osigurati vlastitu financijsku dobrobit u poznijim godinama, a ne oslanjati se na naprijed uplaćene državne penzije te, ponajprije, putem “aktivnog starenja” trebalo bi im se omogućiti da “upravljaju svojim životom što je dulje moguće”.²⁵ Nestajanje onoga što Andrea Muehlebach naziva “kronotropnim djelovanjem države blagostanja” (Muehlebach 2012: 149) stvara nove podjele između “aktivne treće dobi” i “pasivne” i zavisne “četvrti dobi”, kompleksnu krizu države i obitelji, koja je ovisna o rodu, a u kojoj “nije više sasvim očigledno tko se brine o kome, tko osigurava prihod, kako je on raspodijeljen po članovima obitelji i je li i kako dugo djeca i stariji članovi obitelji imaju pravo na obiteljske prihode za pomoć i podršku” (ibid.: 150–151). Muehlebach, međutim, smješta upotrebu činjeničnih “demografskih pretkazanja” unutar “politike uvjeravanja” kojoj je svrha “neutralizirati prijemni proces i spriječiti kritiku”, slično nekom obliku “biološkog determinizma” (ibid.: 160).

Zapravo, nisu *proces*i oni koji su se razlikovali sami po sebi, već su brzina promjena u kontekstu rata, prisilna migracija velikoga broja ljudi i etnička podloga ratnih sukoba bili faktori koji su utjecali na to da su preživljavanje i ponovno stvaranje vlastitog sebstva kao i upravljanje intimnim obiteljskim i srodničkim odnosima, naoko stalni, trajni prijemori u suvremenoj Bosni i Hercegovini. Također je ključan čimbenik i taj, na što nam ukazuje Andreas Hoff, da starenje predstavlja sasvim različit društveni izazov u zemljama koje su postale bogate prije nego što su ostarjele u usporedbi sa zemljama, a to uključuje i Bosnu i Hercegovinu, koje su ostarjele, a da nikada nisu bile bogate (Hoff 2011).

²⁵ Web stranica Europske Komisije: <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1062andlangId=en>.

U svom istraživanju majki djece s posebnim potrebama u Bijeljini, u Bosni i Hercegovini, Čarna Brković (2015) tvrdi da "zbunjujuća sfera socijalne zaštite", sustava koji se doživljava kao "pun pogrešaka, nepredvidljiv i tajnovit", prisiljava majke da budu snalažljive, da mobiliziraju sve resurse koji su im dostupni, uključujući i moguće neformalne kontakte, samo kako bi svojoj djeci osigurale djelić onoga što im uistinu treba. Kao i Zemkine kćeri, majke iz etnografije autorice Brković oslanjaju se, čini se, na izgublenu logiku socijalnog blagostanja kao prava i dužnosti države, a suočene s opetovanim nametanjem logike socijalnog blagostanja kao onoga koje je ograničeno, diskrecijsko i kojem nedostaje samilosti. U slučaju Zemkinih kćeri, ta očekivanja su strukturirana kroz prizmu sjećanja na socijalnu zaštitu kakva je bila u socijalizmu, ali oblikovana novom "projektizacijom" skrbi i, najvažnije, onime što se smatralo moralnom obvezom prema "obiteljima šehida".

Socijalna zaštita u Bosni i Hercegovini, još kao dijelu socijalističke Jugoslavije, kao što pokazuje tekst autorice Hromadžić, bila je zamršeni sustav pun paradoksa, iako su poboljšanja u dostupnosti i kvaliteti socijalne zaštite i zdravstvenog sustava neupitno bili važni pokazatelji jugoslavenske modernosti. Sustav socijalne zaštite bio je, međutim, poprilično dualističan, u smislu urbanog i ruralnog stanovništva, te značajno varijabilan u odnosu na klasu i, najviše, u odnosu na rod. Užasan rat koji se vodio tijekom 1990-ih je, međutim, na neki način zasjenio i iskrivio percepcije o 1980-ima kada se, u mnogo dijelova socijalističke Jugoslavije, uključujući i Bosnu i Hercegovinu, siromaštvo ponovo vratilo i to prvi put u toj generaciji i vrlo loše utjecalo na urbana domaćinstva koja nisu imala nikakve veze sa zemljoradnjom niti su im stizale novčane pošiljke od članova obitelji koji su živjeli u inozemstvu (usp. Archer, Duda i Stubbs 2015). Kako su zdravstveni sustav i sustav socijalne skrbi odgovorili na tu krizu iz 1980-ih, posebice kasnih 1980-ih kada je bilo i sve manje financiranja, ključan je dio slagalice o kojem se zapravo rijetko govori.


Poslijeratna kriza skrbi u Bosni i Hercegovini, uvjetovana procesima "kompleksnog društvenog i političkog inženjeringa" (Lendvai i Stubbs 2009: 681), ostaje i dalje vrlo nestabilna, promjenjiva, te ovisi o raznim okolnostima. Bosnu i Hercegovinu i dalje karakterizira pojava "jake povezanosti međunarodne i domaće sfere" (Pugh 2000), hibridnog i fleksibilnog "kratog igrališta" (Arandarenko i Golcin 2007) punog novo stvorenih i rekonstruiranih aktera koji svi nastoje, na različite načine, preobraziti kolonizirajući i disciplinirajući aparat "reformi", "modernizacije" i "razvoja" u svu silu manje ili više održivih programa i projekata (usp. Stubbs 2015), od kojih su mnogi, sami po sebi, vremenski ograničeni i u kontradikciji su, direktnoj ili indirektnoj, jedni s drugima. Taj vezani međunarodno-domaći prostor predstavlja, na jedan način, zapravo još jednu "polu-odsutnost", zajedno s onima obitelji ili države, iako poduprtu značajnom biopolitičkom moći, mnogostrukim i promjenjivim ideologijama, modalitetima i praksama pružanja, osiguravanja i primanja skrbi koji su "zamršeni, nepouzdati i privremeni" (Hromadžić u tisku 2016). Iako su mnogi od tih "projekata" vjerojatno manje očigledno i neposredno nasilni kao što je to bio slučaj s projektom švicarske vlade iz kasnih 1990-ih, koja je gradila nove domove za starije koji su bili namijenjeni starijim osobama koje su se vratile u Bosnu i Hercegovinu nakon što im je u Švicarskoj odobren privremeni status izbjeglica, svi ipak stvaraju nove nizove značenja, nove hijerarhije moći i institucija, nove oblike uključivanja i isključivanja, nove poretke krivnje i vrline, nove marginalizacije, subordinacije i tišine (Clarke 2004). Oni su središnji za razumijevanje onoga što Hromadžić naziva "istodobno lokalne, regionalne i transnacionalne konfiguracije ljubavi, skrbi i napuštanja".

Upravo je zazivanje državnog "moralnog duga" obiteljima palih mučenika, šehidskim porodicama, ono što najbolje pokazuje nesumjerljivosti, ili nepoklapanja, između strukturnih političkih ekonomija na makro razini i mikro razine svakodnevnog života. Jer i dalje se

događa da, čak i u kontekstu neoliberalne discipliniranosti koja traži da se javna potrošnja smanji, racionalizira i usmjeri na "najpotrebitije", oba entiteta u Bosni i Hercegovini još troše velike sume na ratne veterane i njihove obitelji, unutar mnogo šireg konteksta klijentističkih odnosa "državnog čeličnog zagrljaja" i "institucionalnog partikularizma" u kojem vodeće političke stranke funkcioniraju kao "zaštitnička mašinerija" koja dodjeljuje radna mjesta, gotov novac i skrb, te ostale usluge, u zamjenu za glasove (usp. Ferrera 2000; Stubbs i Zrinščak 2015). Međutim, ono što se često zaboravlja u literaturi koja nudi "pogled odozgo" na klijentizam jest da taj prijelaz iz strukture u svakodnevni život nije automatski, već da sam po sebi zahtijeva da se personalizirana politička agenda "simboličnih obećanja" (Iraolo i Grunenberg 2008: 3) ostvari u praksi. U nedostatku društvenih mreža ili "veza" koje su potrebne da bi moralni kapital obitelji mučenika pretvorile u ono što bi se moglo nazvati kapitalom blagostanja ili skrbi, Zemkine kćeri su prisiljene oslanjati se na pretragu interneta, privatni dom i dobru volju daljnjeg rođaka kako bi dobile tek minimum kratkotrajne zbrinutosti svoje majke. Sva moralna prava koja su mislile da imaju, a zbog čega njihov bijes prerasta u ideju da tuže državu, dovedena su u pitanje optužbama da su same vrlo sebično zapostavljale svoju majku dok nije bilo prekasno, čime su im izmakla sva "etička građanska prava" (Muehlebach 2012: 159) koja su mislile da imaju.

Čini se da je Zemkina priča, zapravo, sažetak svih loših i niti jedne dobre strane starenja koje s pozicije zapadnjačke feminističke kritike promatra Lynne Segal (2013) u svojoj knjizi *Out of Time*. Ona naznačava potrebu za novim diskursom o starenju, odbacujući pritom deterministički diskurs tjelesnog propadanja i kognitivne korozije, a bez da upadne u zamku idealističkog narativa pomirenja, slobode, kreativnosti i ljepote, narativa "uspješnog starenja", koje jako vole isticati suvremeni "gurui životnog stila" i na koji se pozivaju i diskursi o "aktivnom starenju" kojima nas se poziva na odgovornost. Osobe koje stare se također, kako nas podsjeća Segal, razlikuju po rodu, klasi, etnicitetu, seksualnoj orijentaciji, mogućnostima i, možda prije svega, zemljopisnom položaju. "Polu-odsutnost" države i obitelji i Zemkina utjelovljena pozicioniranost u njenom tijelu, mjestu i vremenu, pretvara je u subjekta koji "loše stari", koji treba skrb, pomoć i podršku i kojem je premalo prekasno ponuđeno i za cijenu koju si rijetki mogu priuštiti.

Tekst autorice Hromadžić ne bi trebalo promatrati samo kroz prizmu mogućih promjena u politici. U smislu konteksta skrbi za starije osobe u suvremenoj Bosni i Hercegovini, teško je pronaći nešto više od početnih uvida u "ostale politike", buduće ili alternativne prakse koje bi mogle "staviti u pitanje dominantne politike (...) (i) otvoriti smislen prostor za prijepore, otpore i pozitivne alternative koje nisu samo različite, već koje same mogu učiniti razliku" (Clarke, Bainton, Lendvai i Stubbs 2015: 196). Zemkina priča mnogo jasnije nego ostale ukazuje na potrebu za novim narativom socijalne pomoći, humanije etike skrbi koja se temelji na "međuovisnosti, zajedništvu i ljudskoj ranjivosti", te podiže "društvene, ekonomske i političke vrijednosti skrbi" (Williams 2014: 101), spašavajući "solidarnost" od njene utopljenosti u "moralu" i "tržištima" (Muehlebach 2012: 227-228), "čineći društvenu reprodukciju i skrb temeljima za analizu društvene promjene i globalne krize" (Williams 2014: 87), upućujući na potrebu za mnogostrukim strategijama, projektima i politikama kako bi se nadišle navedene krize.



SVRT NA KOMENTARE

Azra Hromadžić

Na početku želim zahvaliti urednicama što su odabrale uistinu izvrsnu i raznorodnu skupinu diskutanata koji su komentirali moj članak. Komentari su im sadržajni i poticajni te se međusobno nalaze u jednom produktivnom nesuglasju. Moji odgovori na njihove ocjene su brojni, ali ovdje ću se usredotočiti na tri velike teme: “odgovornost”, “kontinuitet” i “metode”.

Mnogo diskutanata se osvrnulo, na ovaj ili onaj način, na pitanje koje je zapravo temelj moga članka: tko bi trebao pružiti skrb (i kako)? Očekivano, različiti diskutanti nude sasvim različite odgovore na to pitanje i na izazove koje ono postavlja – od Stubbsa i Danelyja, koji su preporučili da uključim i dodatne “polu-odsutnosti” (međunarodne zajednice, Zemke, našu vlastitu...) i “polu-priznavanja”²⁶ tom cijelom “kontekstu skrbi”, pa do Milenkovića, koji je predložio sasvim drugačije čitanje/analizu glavnog fenomena kojim se članak bavi, većinom kroz prizmu *individualne* odgovornosti. Međutim, fokusiranje na Zemkinu individualnu odgovornost za vlastitu skrb, što predlaže Milenković, bilo bi vrlo problematično i prikrilo bi širu – strukturnu, političku i ekonomsku – situaciju i procese koji su se posložili u uzrokovanju Zemkine individualne patnje,²⁷ ali bi pokrenulo i ono što me Stubbs, u svojem komentaru, molio *da ne činim*:

Reproduciram starije ideje o podjelama na one koji “zaslužuju” i one koji “ne zaslužuju”, te time namećem “moralizirajuće” i “otrežnjujuće” osude onima koji se nisu bili u stanju brinuti za članove vlastite obitelji, što sve tjera institucije javnog zdravstva i socijalne skrbi da donose teške odluke i njima maksimaliziraju učinke i smanje troškove. Korisnici pomoći više ne bi trebali biti “pasivni” primatelji naknada, već se od njih očekuje da su “aktivni” na mnogim poljima.

Milenkovićev prijedlog da Zemka, kao i (svi) ostali na balkanskoj polu-periferiji, uzmu stvari u svoje (vlastite) ruke vrlo problematično oslikava balkansko stanovništvo kao demokratski/liberalistički nemušto, gotovo dječje neupućeno, te time samo internalizira i perpetuira balkanističke diskurse.²⁸ S druge strane, takva politika i politički diskurs koji su temeljeni na raspodjeli prava stvorili bi zamršen i potencijalno korumpirani sustav klasifikacije koji bi definirao tko su ti pojedinci koji su, kako Milenković kaže, bili neposredno izloženi ratnim stradanjima, pa stoga i zaslužili državnu skrb. U zemlji u kojoj je, kako nas u ovom broju podsjećaju Rubić i Petrović, 100 000 ljudi izgubilo živote i 2 700 000 od 4 000 000 postalo

²⁶ Izuzetno cijenim Danelyjev izvrstan prijedlog da uz polu-odsutnosti uključim i polu-priznavanja u promišljanje novih hijerarhija i koordinata priznavanja.

²⁷ Zemkina situacija je, naravno, jedinstvena, zbog specifičnog načina na koji su se veliki čimbenici posložili i uzrokovali njenu patnju. Ti čimbenici nisu, međutim, slučajni; oni su povijesno uvjetovani, neregulirani sustavi regulacije života; analiza Zemkine priče razotkriva neke od tih čimbenika i njihova stjecišta.

²⁸ U vezi s time, Milenković završava svoj komentar upozoravajući na antropologe koji pridonose “neo-kolektivističkim antiliberalnim pokretima za koje, povijest nas uči, znamo da po pravilu provociraju fašizam u našim društvima i mogu predstavljati vajmarovski uvod u nove ratove, pljačkašku redistribuciju privatne imovine i uništavanje javnog u ime kolektivnog”. Čudno je da se Milenković usredotočuje na strah od “pljačkaške redistribucije privatne imovine i uništavanja javnog u ime kolektivnog” u povijesnom trenutku kada se objekti jugoslavenske industrije i javne infrastrukture u Bosni i Hercegovini i izvan nje privisavaju od strane etno-nacionalističkih političara/biznismena putem korumpirane privatizacije i onoga što je David Harvey (2004) nazvao “stjecanjem putem otimanja”.

izbjeglice ili protjerano, odvajanje onih koji su *neposredno* bili izloženi ratu projekt je koji je unaprijed osuđen na propast i koji bi ujedno negirao intersubjektivnu prirodu (ratnoga) iskustva. Umjesto da pokušavamo izbrisati učinke fizičkog i strukturalnog nasilja na živote ljudi u ime odgovornosti pojedinca, predlažem da pretpostavimo jednu inkluzivniju i "humaniju etiku skrbi koja se temelji na međuovisnosti, zajedništvu i ljudskoj ranjivosti" (Stubbs, u ovom broju). Takva etika skrbi objedinjavala bi ideale kao što su pravda, jednakost i prava pojedinaca i principe kao što su skrb, povjerenje, međusobno poštovanje i solidarnost (Held 2006).²⁹

Druga velika tema koja zahtijeva dodatna pojašnjenja je kontinuitet i diskontinuitet između socijalističke prošlosti i postsocijalističke sadašnjosti. Neki diskutanti kritizirali su moje prividno suprotstavljanje tih dvaju sustava, u kojem navodno privilegiram prošlost u odnosu na sadašnjost (takvo tumačenje posebno je vidljivo u tekstovima autora Rubić i Petrović te Milenković).³⁰ Moj članak, međutim, naglašava i *kontinuitete* i *diskontinuitete* između socijalističkih i postsocijalističkih iskustava. Diskontinuiteti su jasni: ratom izazvan nagli raspad bivše države, življenih sudbina i materijalnih objekata, elementi su koje ovdje ne moram ponavljati.³¹ Ali postoji barem jedan *veliki kontinuitet* između socijalizma i postsocijalizma koji je ključan kao potpora glavnom argumentu moga članka: *očekivanje da obitelj osigura skrb*. Točnije, u članku navodim:

Paternalistički odnos i samo-projekcije jugoslavenske države i njenih građana i "strukture osjećaja" (Williams 1977) koje su oni izazivali, bili su, međutim, duboko utemeljeni na tradicijskim oblicima obiteljske skrbi. Primjerice, Bosanci, posebice Bosanke, tradicionalno su skrbile o starijim članovima obitelji. Slično kao i u mnogim istočnoeuropskim zemljama u kojima je država odavala dojam brižne države, u stvarnosti su "privatna domena srodstva, prijateljstva i osobnih veza postala temeljem za emocionalno uvjetovanu i društveno utemeljenu skrb". (Read 2007: 206)

To je važno naglasiti jer potvrđuje, a i drugi su slično predlagali, da je socijalistički sustav skrbi bio dualistički, neujednačen, rodno uvjetovan i parcijalan (Stubbs, u ovom broju; Podgorelec, u ovom broju), i često samo proklamatoran (Rubić i Petrović, u ovom broju). Ono što ovdje smatram najvažnijim (i to sam možda trebala jasnije naglasiti u svom članku) jest da su se i *socijalistički* i *postsocijalistički režimi skrbi*, bez obzira na njihovu retoriku, u praksi *oslanjali na obitelj kao izvor skrbi*. Kao što naglašavaju Rubić i Petrović, institucija bosanske obitelji u vrijeme socijalizma bila je vrlo kompleksna i bila je svjedokom velikih transformacija, uključujući masivne migracije iz ruralnih u urbana područja (vidjeti Bringa 1995). No, bez obzira na te značajne promjene, bosanska obitelj u socijalizmu je općenito bila, posebno u usporedbi s današnjom situacijom, financijski i socijalno mnogo bolje zbrinuta te zemljo-

²⁹ Moj pristup etičkim dimenzijama skrbi inspiriran je radom Virginie Held (*Ethics of Care* 2006). Autorica nas poziva da promislimo o našim odnosima, pa stoga i našim odgovornostima i vezanostima, našim obiteljima i društvenim skupinama. U svojoj knjizi Held propituje te veze, usredotočujući se na odnose skrbi, a ne samo na vrline i odgovornosti pojedinaca.

³⁰ Vjerujem, međutim, da imamo dobrih razloga da budemo nostalgični, barem prema nekim aspektima socijalističke prošlosti, posebice ako usporedimo sadašnji i životni standard u prošlosti, relativni položaj u svijetu, te dostupnost socijalne pomoći, između ostalog. Slažem se, međutim, sa Stubbsom, Milenkovićem i autoricama Rubić i Petrović da je detaljnije arhivsko istraživanje i analiza socijalističkog razdoblja, posebice krize 1980-ih, svakako potrebna i svoja ču buduća istraživanja produbiti u tom smjeru.

³¹ U odgovoru na komentar autorica Rubić i Petrović da ljudi nisu "preko noći" počeli živjeti prema novom modelu, željela bih dodati da su se mnogima u Bosni i Hercegovini životi uistinu, u velikoj mjeri, "promijenili naglo, preko noći" i da su mnogi koje sam intervjuirala mogli definirati točan datum kada su im se životi promijenili (primjerice, noć kada su nasilno prognani iz svojih gradova, dan kada se njihovi prijatelji iz razreda "druge etničke pripadnosti" nisu više pojavili u školi ili noć kada je počela opsada). Upravo je u tim trenucima život kakav su poznavali prestao postojati, a novi model života, njih kao izbjeglica, prognanika ili pod opsadom, je započeo. Također, usporedo s ratom, počeo se odvijati proces privatizacije javne i državne imovine, dakle, sasvim novi model. Taj proces korumpirane privatizacije, međutim, bio je prikriven i iskrivljen ratom.

pisno kompaktna.³² Danas, međutim, kada se službeni podaci o stopi nezaposlenosti kreću oko 27% (63% među mlađim stanovništvom),³³ obitelji su *financijski onemogućene* i najčešće si ne mogu priuštiti da skrbe o svojim potrebitim starijim članovima (što jasno navodi i Podgorelec u svom tekstu). Štoviše, budući da su članovi obitelji često nezaposleni, oni zapravo žive od mirovina svojih starijih članova. Uz sve te financijske izazove i zbog problema koji su nastali zbog ratom prouzročеног izbjeglištva, mnogobrojne je obitelji rat razdvojio i članovi su *fizički odsutni*, što dodatno otežava skromnu i o obiteljima ovisnu skrb o starijima.³⁴ Zaključno, “kriza skrbi” prisutna je u većini europskih zemalja zbog razloga koje Stubbs vrlo lijepo objašnjava u svom tekstu; međutim, specifični izazovi te krize posebno su vidljivi i prisutni u Bosni i Hercegovini, koja “je ostarjela, a da nikada nije bila bogata” (Hoff 2011 prema Stubbsu, u ovom broju) i u kojoj su se poslijeratni i postsocijalistički kontekst vrlo očigledno i moćno spojili.

Naposljetku i o metodama: neki diskutanti kritiziraju moje oslanjanje na samo jednu priču (Zemkinu) te moj “nedostatak refleksivnosti” u članku. Slažem se s Rubić i Petrović kada tvrde da oslanjanje na jednu individualnu priču može biti “riskantno”, jer je vrlo lako skliznuti u anegdotalan prikaz (vidjeti i Milenković, u ovom broju). Slažem se s njima i da priča, kako bi bila antropološki produktivna, mora biti postavljena u širi kontekst – i to sam nastojala postići raspravom o ratu i (post)socijalističkim aspektima koji su se posložili kao uzroci Zemkine individualne patnje.³⁵

Komentar o refleksivnosti i emskoj i etskoj poziciji me zapravo najviše interesira. Naravno da sam svjesna važnosti refleksivnosti u etnografskom i antropološkom pisanju i smatram da je etički važno i analitički produktivno (naravno, kada ne zamjenjuje etnografske podatke vlastitim refleksijama).³⁶ Nisam, međutim, sasvim uvjerena da bi refleksivnost nužno obogatila moj uvodni tekst. Naprotiv, uključivanje moje osobne povijesti samo bi preusmjerilo pažnju od Zemkine na moju vlastitu priču na način koji ne bi bio niti produktivan niti poželjan, a mogao bi i odvratiti pažnju od etike skrbi te se činiti samodopadnim. Da bi bile efektivne, refleksivne intervencije moraju nešto rasvijetliti ili pojasniti nešto o terenu, susretima na terenu i tumačenjima tih susreta. Nakon što sam vrlo pažljivo pročitala komentar autorica Rubić i Petrović i dalje se pitam koji je to točno aspekt moje analize ili etnografskog susreta manjkav zbog mog “neuspjeha” da pojasnim svoju poziciju – kroz koordinate nacionalizma/etniciteta, klase ili roda – u tekstu? Što je to, prema autoricama, što ja nisam “vidjela” zbog

³² Situacija je, naravno, bila mnogo bolja u početnim desetljećima socijalističkog razdoblja; broj nezaposlenih u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji polako je rastao od 6.6% 1965. godine do 16.1% 1987. godine kada se promovirala radna migracija muškaraca srednje životne dobi (Woodward 1995: 199, 378). Većina tih ljudi radila je u Austriji, Njemačkoj i drugim europskim zemljama kao manualni radnici i radnici u građevinarstvu, a vraćali su se kući svojim obiteljima vikendima i praznicima.

³³ Prema podacima Agencije za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine, službeni podaci o stopi nezaposlenih, izračunati po ILO metodologiji su 27% (vidjeti: http://www.bhas.ba/?option=com_publicacija&id=1&lang=ba). Međutim, neki izvori javljaju da nominalna stopa nezaposlenih doseže čak 44% (vidjeti: <http://www.business.hr/ekonomija/stvarna-nezaposlenost-u-bih-27-posto-nominalna-cak-44-posto>).

³⁴ Ovaj se tekst nije bavio rodnim aspektom skrbi (o starijima) i dodatnim teretom koji on predstavlja za žene, što je glavna tema jednog drugog članka koji upravo pišem. Važno je istaknuti da su socijalističke radne migracije uglavnom uključivale muškarce, što znači da su žene većinom ostajale u Bosni gdje su i dalje – uz brigu o kućanstvu i odgoju djece – skrbile i o starijima. Ratno izbjeglištvo je, međutim, proginalo i muškarce i žene, a obitelji je rastrgalo na takve načine da žene često nisu bile u mogućnosti skrbiti o starijima.

³⁵ Slažem se, međutim, s autorima (Rubić i Petrović te Milenković) da je taj dio članka mogao biti bolje poduprt arhivskim istraživanjem i korištenjem malobrojne, ali relevantne literature. Budući da je ovo terensko istraživanje tek u povojima, u budućnosti se nadam poboljšati i proširiti te aspekte istraživanja.

³⁶ Primjerice, u svojoj knjizi *Citizens of an Empty Nation* vrlo se dosljedno bavim vlastitom pozicijom na terenu kako bih objasnila potku svojih susretanja, procjena i tumačenja.

svoje navodne bliskosti s terenom?³⁷ Odgovori na ta pitanja uistinu su važni; u suprotnom bi refleksivnost (problematično) mogla postati sama sebi svrhom.

I za kraj, slažem se da ne možemo generalizirati situaciju u Bosni i Hercegovini ili, još gore, na Balkanu iz jednog, u ovom slučaju Zemkinog, iskustva – to mi nije ni bila namjera u tekstu koji sam ponudila. Osobno, ne bih koristila romantičarski i egzotični diskurs poput "jedna šara na bosanskom ćilimu" kako bih opisala Zemkino iskustvo u odnosu na širi "kontekst". Naprotiv, smatram da je njena individualna kombinacija skrbi, napuštanja i patologije proizašla iz spoja njenih osobnih okolnosti i povijesno uvjetovane, kompleksne mreže obitelji, medicine, države i ekonomije.

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³⁷ U vezi s time, jednako je problematična podjela na emsko i etsko – zastarjeli su to termini u antropologiji koji grubo dijele svijet na (većinom konceptualizirani putem nacije i "rase") insajdere i autsajdere. Nije li svaki etnografski teren stalno pregovaranje i manevriranje mnogostrukim linijama uključenosti i isključenosti koje zamagljuju razlike i nikada nisu jednoznačne i jedinstvene, te stavljaju u pitanje dihotomiju emsko/etsko i oblike znanja (etsko/objektivno nasuprot emskom/subjektivnom) koje navodno stvaraju?

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